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Abstract 
In this dissertation, I consider from a philosophical perspective three related questions 
concerning the contribution of mathematics to scientific representation. In answering 
these questions, I propose and defend Carnapian frameworks for examination into the 
nature and role of mathematics in science. 
The first research question concerns the varied ways in which mathematics contributes 
to scientific representation. In response, I consider in Chapter 2 two recent philosophical 
proposals claiming to account for the explanatory role of mathematics in science, by 
Philip Kitcher, and Otavio Bueno and Mark Colyvan. My novel and detailed critique of 
these accounts shows that they are too limited to encompass the diverse roles of 
mathematics in science in historical and contemporary scenarios. The conclusion is that 
any such philosophical account should aim to faithfully capture the structure of our 
theories and their use in applied contexts. 
This insight prompts the second question guiding this dissertation that I consider in 
Chapter 3, regarding a viable philosophical account of the role of mathematics in 
scientific theories. I respond by proposing a modified form of the reconstructive 
frameworks for philosophical analysis developed by Rudolf Carnap for theoretical 
entities. I propose three amendments to Carnap’s account: i) a semantic view for the 
representation of theories, ii) a careful consideration of instances of the use of theory in 
representing target systems, and iii) consideration of the practical complexity of relating 
theory to experimental data. 
  ii 
The final research question for this dissertation asks what, if anything, we can 
legitimately conclude about the nature of theoretical entities invoked by a theory in light 
of its success in representing phenomena. In the backdrop of the Carnapian frameworks 
proposed in Chapter 3, I argue that contemporary ontological debates in the philosophy of 
science are largely premised on an acceptance of Willard Quine’s epistemological 
outlook on the world and a dismissal of Carnap’s approach, which can be used to offer a 
satisfactory deflationary resolution. This is in the service of my contention that a 
Carnapian attitude to central issues in the philosophy of science is decidedly preferable to 
the route championed by Quine. 
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There have been and still are geometricians and philosophers, and even 
some of the most distinguished, who doubt whether the whole universe, or to 
speak more widely the whole of existence, was only created in Euclid’s 
geometry; they even dare to dream that two parallel lines, which according 
to Euclid can never meet on earth, may meet somewhere in infinity. I have 
come to the conclusion that, since I can’t understand even that, I can’t 
expect to understand about God. I acknowledge humbly that I have no 
faculty for settling such questions, I have a Euclidean earthly mind, and how 
could I solve problems that are not of this world? And I advise you never to 
think about it either, my dear Alyosha, especially about God, whether He 
exists or not. All such questions are utterly inappropriate for a mind created 
with an idea of only three dimensions. 
 
Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov 
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1 Introduction 
Mathematics has long been a handmaiden of science. The two have become ever more 
intimate with time such that as a matter of course, theories in many areas of science are 
articulated and models of these theories are developed in the language of mathematics. 
However, a lack of clarity persists in much of contemporary philosophical thinking 
regarding several matters related to this activity. These include the ontological status of 
the mathematics used in our scientific theories, the ways in which mathematics is useful 
in formulating these theories, and whether mathematics can play explanatory, predictive, 
or confirmational roles in science and, if so, what these precisely involve. This curiosity 
regarding the relation between mathematics and its use in scientific representation has 
manifested itself in the form of several related questions and claims in the philosophical 
literature. In spite of its importance, there thus far seems to be no philosophical consensus 
on the role of mathematics in science. Nonetheless, there does appear to be a growing 
realisation that mathematics can contribute to scientific representation in a variety of 
ways.1 
In light of the clear epistemological benefits of the application of mathematics to 
science, many philosophers have adopted strong metaphysical theses regarding the 
existence of mathematical entities and operations used in scientific representation. 
Roughly, the idea is that since our most successful scientific theories seek to describe and 
predict phenomena and are thought to be accurate descriptions thereof, we ought to be 
committed to entities posited by these theories. As reference to mathematical entities is 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Wilson (2006) and Pincock (2012). 
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an indispensable part of our most successful scientific theories, we ought thus to believe 
in their existence as well. Debate over this thesis—known as the Indispensability 
Argument—has persisted for over five decades,2 with proponents of either side weighing 
in with observations and arguments that have caused the discussion to evolve 
significantly since its commencement. 
In this dissertation, I consider from a philosophical perspective three general questions 
concerning the contribution of mathematics to scientific representation. These questions 
raise issues regarding the role of mathematics in such representation, the possibility of a 
philosophical account of scientific theories that can help clarify and explicate this role, 
and those related to the ontological status of mathematics arising out of its successful 
application to physical systems. The instances of representation that I treat in the course 
of this dissertation will primarily be drawn from literature in the philosophy of science, 
and will vary in their complexity and detail. Furthermore, while the claims made here 
should be considered to hold for all scientific disciplines that employ mathematics to 
represent, most of the examples and cases that I use are from theoretical and applied 
physics. These include scenarios from fluid dynamics, graph theory, and 
electromagnetism. In order to be able to accommodate such a scope of instances and 
consistently consider them in light of diverse philosophical approaches, I offer a minimal, 
liberal description of a (mathematical) scientific representation as that which has as its 
content the existence of certain kinds of relations between a mathematical structure and 
the arrangement of certain properties and quantities in the relevant scientific domain3. A 
                                                 
2 See Colyvan (2001) for a comprehensive history of the issue. 
3 This description is from (Pincock 2012, 27). 
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mathematical structure in turn is a collection of mathematical objects with some formal 
relations obtaining among them. I approach the specific questions that follow, regarding 
the contribution of mathematics to scientific representation, as ones that straddle the 
boundary between the general philosophy of science and the philosophy of applied 
mathematics. Moreover, as will become evident, I use traditional philosophical methods 
of analysis and argumentation in conjunction with an emphasis on important details of 
the reasoning involved in particular scientific contexts by way of methodology. The 
eventual result is the proposal and defence of a Carnapian framework to examine and 
explain the role of theoretical entities, including mathematics, in our scientific theories. 
Furthermore, I argue that the attitude towards the status of theoretical entities that follows 
from the kind of framework that I propose helps dissolve a number of spurious 
ontological debates in philosophy, such as the Indispensability Argument issue 
mentioned above, by showing that they are misguided because they are based on 
questions that are not well formed. Such an attitude can also provide direction for 
productive research in the discipline in general, and in the philosophy of science in 
particular. 
I now turn to the three questions that guide my project in this dissertation, and provide 
an overview of the role of each subsequent chapter in advancing the above thesis as a 
response to them. 
 
1.1 Guiding questions 
A. How does mathematics assist in scientific representation? 
  4 
B. Is there a promising philosophical account available to represent the 
theoretical/mathematical entities employed in our scientific theories in order 
to help clarify and explain their role? 
C. What can we conclude about the nature of theoretical/mathematical entities 
employed in a theory from its success in representing phenomena? More 
generally, what philosophical benefit, if any, is to be expected from 
ontological inquiries of the above sort, and how ought it to shape our 
preferences concerning research questions in the discipline? 
 
The above questions can be reasonably thought to engage a number of important 
questions in contemporary literature in the philosophy of science. Each of these is taken 
up in order in the three subsequent chapters, whereas Chapter 5 summarises my responses 
to them in light of my findings. My treatment of these questions will show that they 
continue to be the subject of intensive inquiries and lively debates in the philosophy of 
science. Thematically, A is an investigation into the role of mathematics in scientific 
representation, whereas C scrutinises the issue of its ontological status in light of its 
employment in our successful scientific theories. In this vein, B can be considered to be 
an intermediate inquiry that bridges A and C, and is grounded in the idea that a 
philosophical account of formal theories that can appropriately represent the role of 
theoretical/mathematical entities can help us frame, assess, and address questions 
regarding their status. That is, if we have available to us an account that can clarify and 
explain the role of mathematics as it is used in science, we will be better able to 
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determine whether questions pertaining to the ontological status of theoretical entities are 
warranted and, if so, how they ought to be pursued. 
All three questions form the following narrative for this dissertation: My response to A 
in Chapter 2 shows that contemporary philosophical accounts of the contribution of 
mathematics to scientific representation that claim to circumscribe all or the bulk of such 
instances within their ambit are unsatisfactory because they are too limited in the face of 
the sheer diversity of such contributions. The limitation in the frameworks proposed in 
these accounts also stems from a lack of attention to historical and contemporary 
instances of the application of mathematics to science. This prompts B, in response to 
which I propose and defend my Carnapian frameworks as appropriate to represent for the 
philosophical analysis of the mathematics used in science in a manner harmonious with 
practical considerations. Finally, in posing C, I do not intend to suggest that questions 
regarding the ontological status of theoretical or mathematical entities are inevitable or 
even appropriate in light of the successful contribution of mathematics to scientific 
representation.4 However, given that the ontological status of theoretical entities 
continues to be hotly debated in the philosophies of science and mathematics, where the 
Indispensability Argument issue is exemplary, it is well worth inquiring into the 
assumptions that ground such disagreements. Furthermore, since I propose Carnapian 
frameworks of analysis for the explication of mathematical/theoretical terms in 
representation, it is only natural to extend this inquiry to investigate the merits of the 
attitude that follows from adherence to such frameworks towards ontological issues in the 
                                                 
4 Indeed, as will become clear in §4.3, I do think that such questions are misguided in their standard 
philosophical formulations. 
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philosophy of science. Lastly, should I be correct in my contention that such an approach 
can help us reframe and dismiss a number of such debates and guide us in pursuing 
productive questions, the philosophy of science would benefit greatly from an according 
shift in focus. Thus, it is only appropriate that I try to convince the philosophical 
community that ontological issues are undeserving of the considerable research interest 
that they continue to garner. 
A minor note on usage. In the statement of C above, I hint at the interchangeable use 
of the terms “theoretical” and “mathematical.” As will become evident in Chapters 3 and 
4, I do so because the debate in the philosophical literature regarding the ontological 
status of mathematics has been largely conducted in such terms. However, the reader 
should note that insofar as I intend to focus here on theories in physics, which are 
formally articulated using mathematics, an investigation into the role of theoretical 
entities should be considered a natural part of an inquiry into the mathematics used in our 
theories. 
 
1.2 The role of mathematics in representation: Explanation 
In order to address A above, I consider in Chapter 2 two accounts of the role of 
mathematics in science, one proposed by Kitcher (1981, 1989) and the other by Bueno 
and Colyvan (2011). To the best of my knowledge, these are the only two all-
encompassing proposals in the recent philosophical literature for the application of 
mathematics to scientific representation, in that their respective claims are intended to 
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pertain to all applied mathematics.5 Furthermore, my choice of these accounts is 
motivated by the fact that, while varying in their respective aims and details, both purport 
to highlight the explanatory contributions of mathematics to scientific representation. The 
arena of explanation appears to be naturally suited to an investigation of the contribution 
of mathematics to science. Hempel proposed his famous Deductive–Nomological model 
of scientific explanation (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948) because of a Humean suspicion 
of the notion of causation (Cartwright 2004). Models of scientific explanation that have 
been proposed in the philosophical literature tend to gloss over the role of mathematics in 
furnishing such explanation.6 Since mathematics is a science of abstraction, an account of 
the explanatory contributions of mathematics to scientific representation offers 
considerable promise: divorced from considerations that pertain exclusively to scientific 
explanation, an investigation into the explanatory role of mathematics in science should 
help illuminate the ways in which the former contributes to the latter.  
Kitcher sees the explanatory activity of mathematics in science as consisting in its 
ability to unify by using the most economical argument patterns to generate the largest 
number of conclusions regarding the world, in the same manner as an optimisation 
problem. He writes in the wake of debilitating attacks on the covering law model of 
explanation as well as the enterprise of Logical Empiricism in the philosophy of science. 
Kitcher is sympathetic to the spirit of the empiricist enterprise, and looks to incorporate 
many of its features into his model. Bueno and Colyvan have put forth a bolder proposal 
                                                 
5 Strictly speaking, this is true of Kitcher only if I add the phrase “all applied mathematics within the 
restrictions imposed by the conceptual focus of the proposal,” since his account only considers its 
explanatory role in these applications. However, it is intended to apply to all instances where the 
mathematics can be said to be explanatory. 
6 Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) and Hempel (1965a, b) are two such instances. Others, such as 
Salmon (1984) and Dowe (2000), ignore the role of mathematics in explanation altogether. 
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that aims to capture all contributions of mathematics to science by focusing on mappings 
between empirical and mathematical structures. It is not unreasonable to see their effort 
as part of a structuralist revival in the philosophy of science in Britain.7  
In response to the question How does mathematics assist in scientific representation?, 
my examination of the above explanatory accounts yields at least two such ways: i) by 
connecting different phenomena using mathematical analogies, and ii) by isolating 
recurring features of phenomena through acausal representations. Moreover, in spite of 
the varying contextual motivations of the projects of Kitcher and Bueno and Colyvan, the 
significant differences in their respective approaches and details thereof, and the diversity 
in the arguments I use to critique them, I find a common way in which both accounts 
seem to falter: due to “structural deficiencies,” whereby the frameworks for 
representation proposed in both these accounts are too narrow to accommodate a number 
of explanatory contributions of mathematics to science in historical as well as 
contemporary scenarios. This oversight can be seen as a symptom of an old disease in 
philosophy, of the making of sweeping claims about science while disregarding the 
details of its practice. The upshot of my detailed treatment of each proposal is that a 
crucial desideratum of any general framework aiming to capture the contribution of 
mathematics to science is that it be able to faithfully capture the structure of our theories. 
In particular, such an account should outline clear mechanisms for the assignment of 
interpretations to the theoretical entities used in a representation and clarify the inter-
relationships among them. This involves taking heed of the ways in which a theory is 
                                                 
7 See, for instance, da Costa and French (2003), French and Ladyman (1999, 2003a, 2003b), Ladyman 
(1998), and Ladyman and Ross (2007). 
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related to experimental contexts for its verification as well as the manner in which it is 
used to solve problems in the world. 
It is this insight that prompts question B in §1.1 regarding a general account for the 
representation of theoretical entities in science, which is addressed in Chapter 3. 
 
1.3 A Carnapian framework for theoretical entities 
The general philosophical accounts of representation referred to in the inquiry in B in 
§1.1 can loosely be considered to be ones that can adequately reflect the structure of our 
scientific theories. Such accounts would clarify the logical and mathematical rules 
assumed by our theories. They would also be capable of articulating fundamental 
scientific laws, specifying the manner in which crucial theoretical notions therein are 
defined and empirically interpreted, and describing the assumptions needed in order to 
devise a representation. In Chapter 3, by way of a response to the question Is there a 
promising philosophical account available to represent the theoretical/mathematical 
entities employed in our scientific theories in order to help clarify and explain their 
role?, my proposal and defence of a Carnapian framework for the reconstruction of 
scientific theories is based on the recognition that any account purporting to treat 
theoretical entities as they are employed in science should be conceived of and structured 
in a manner that respects scientific reasoning as well as its dialectical relationship with 
the vast array of relevant experimental procedures and concerns, whereby the activity in 
one domain informs and is informed by that in the other. I choose a conception based 
heavily on Rudolf Carnap’s work because frameworks for reconstruction of the kind that 
  10 
he proposes appear, at least prima facie,8 to be well suited to an examination of theories 
in physics. 
In addition to my defence of the treatment of theoretical entities in his linguistic 
frameworks against criticisms in the literature, I propose three amendments to Carnap’s 
account: i) a semantic view for the representation of theories, whereby a theory is taken 
to be a family of models rather than a set of sentences, as in the syntactic view, ii) a 
careful, detailed “bottom-up” consideration of instances of the use of theory in 
representing target systems, in contrast to the traditional philosophical approach based on 
a priori concerns or toy examples, and iii) a consideration of the practical complexity of 
relating theory to experimental data. As with the rationale for the transition from question 
A to B as well as my adoption of a framework based on his proposal, my departures from 
Carnap’s account, which render my proposal properly Carnapian, are similarly driven by 
the desire to be appropriately sensitive to scientific reasoning as applied to the 
formulation and evaluation of theories. Moreover, my defence of this conception against 
influential criticisms in §3.4 and §3.5 locates flaws in certain assumptions grounding 
them that evince a similar failure to engage scientific reasoning that came to the fore in 
my critiques of the accounts of mathematical explanation in Chapter 2. My aim is to 
show that my Carnapian frameworks can usefully represent theoretical entities in science 
in a manner harmonious with scientific practice. 
 
                                                 
8 See Stein (1992) and (1994) for arguments to this end. 
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1.4 The ontological status of mathematics 
A common tendency in the general philosophical literature is to hastily read off 
ontology from successful representational systems in science. Among the many 
unfortunate consequences of this predilection is the pursuit of misguided debates 
regarding the nature of theoretical entities, a major reason for which is a widespread 
misunderstanding of the nature and role of frameworks in scientific theorising and 
representation. In consonance with my proposal of a Carnapian conception of theoretical 
entities in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 highlights this error through a pragmatic comparison of 
the influential epistemic views of Carnap and Willard Quine. The difference between the 
two thinkers’ views naturally manifests itself most starkly in the arena of the ontological 
status of the theoretical, and hence mathematical, entities posited by our scientific 
theories. Quine sees philosophy as continuous with science,9 where the latter is an inquiry 
into reality, and thus sees no need to manufacture a distinction in our body of knowledge 
between theoretical and factual content. He thus thinks that all of our knowledge, 
including the theoretical components of our scientific theories, is subject to empirical 
verification. Carnap rejects questions concerning the status of theoretical terms as 
conceptually misguided, where his outlook is firmly embedded in and influenced by his 
linguistic frameworks. 
In seeking to frame and address the final substantive question guiding this 
dissertation—What can we conclude about the nature of theoretical entities employed in 
a theory from its success in representing phenomena, and how ought we to shape our 
                                                 
9 According to Quine (1981b), this is one of the “five milestones” achieved by Empiricism in the last 
two centuries. 
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preferences concerning research questions in the discipline in light of anticipated 
philosophical benefit?—I argue that contemporary ontological debates in the philosophy 
of science are largely premised on an acceptance of Quine’s epistemological outlook on 
the world and the standards of justification pertaining to our knowledge of it, which 
implies a dismissal of Carnap’s view. I then show how adherence to the Quinean 
perspective has sparked spurious debates in philosophy, most recently instantiated by the 
aforementioned Indispensability Argument issue, that continue to rage without a 
consensus on the conceptualisation of the issues at hand, the methodology or set of 
methodologies appropriate to apply to the problem once it is precisely formulated, the 
standards of evidence that are considered admissible, and so on. Hence, the pursuit of 
research questions in the philosophy of science that lead to unfruitful discussions of this 
nature is inadvisable. On the contrary, by engaging a recent debate that reflects on 
ontological questions in the backdrop of the theoretical and experimental research that led 
to the confirmation of the atomic hypothesis in the early 20th century, I show how 
Carnap’s approach to questions regarding the ontological status of theoretical entities in 
science can be used to offer a satisfactory deflationary resolution. This is in the service of 
my contention that such an attitude to central issues in the philosophy of science is 
decidedly preferable to the route championed by Quine. 
 
1.5 Limitations 
The role of mathematics in scientific representation encompasses an enormous amount 
of knowledge from a number of disciplines. Hence, any attempt to treat the subject in its 
entirety by taking into account all relevant dimensions and perspectives is unlikely to 
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succeed. Furthermore, even within the more restrictive confines of my philosophical 
approach to the issue in this dissertation, the extent and depth of my treatment of each of 
the research questions stated in §1.1 has been conditioned by my overarching advocacy 
of a Carnapian approach in considering questions concerning the role and nature of 
mathematics as used in our scientific theories. For instance, with regard to my response to 
A, the modes of mathematical explanation that come to the fore from my consideration of 
proposals by Kitcher and Bueno and Colyvan are not by any means exhaustive of the 
explanatory contributions of mathematics, nor are they intended to be. At the very least, 
the philosophical literature on the issue has yielded a number of explanatory 
contributions that I do not consider.10 This limitation arises out of my interest only in 
general, all-encompassing philosophical accounts of the contribution of mathematics to 
representation. Similarly, with regard to B, I only consider and defend a Carnapian 
conception of theoretical entities in representation, to the exclusion of other accounts, 
e.g., Kuhn’s (1962) paradigms for scientific theories.11 However, a careful consideration 
of even a few representational frameworks of this sort would easily make for a 
dissertation of its own. And so I restrict myself to the proposal and defence of my 
Carnapian conception. Finally, the Quinean and Carnapian perspectives do not at all sum 
up philosophical opinions on the ontology of theoretical entities in science.12 However, 
                                                 
10 See, for instance, Pincock (2012, §3.2) and Batterman (2002). 
11
 I do not mean to suggest that the approach or aims of Kuhn’s enterprise are similar to those of 
Carnap’s. However, among other things, Kuhn was concerned with the articulation of important scientific 
theories and their application for the solution of important problems—one sense in which he used the word 
“paradigm.” In this sense, he can be said to be involved in a similar project to that pursued by Carnap. See 
Pincock (2012, 122) for a relevant comparison between the two. 
12 For example, see Schaffer (2009) for a summary of a neo-Aristotelian programme of metaphysics as a 
response to the Quinean and the Carnapian approaches. 
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insofar as they form the bulk of the general perspectives in the philosophy of science, I 
have chosen to busy myself with them to the exclusion of other outlooks. 
 
 
As mentioned in §1.1, the questions posed and addressed in this dissertation engage 
important philosophical queries regarding the role and ontological status of mathematical 
entities used in science. In offering responses to the questions stated at the outset, my 
hope in this work is to recommend Carnapian frameworks for the philosophical 
examination of the contributions of theoretical entities in general, and mathematics in 
particular, to our scientific thought. Misconceptions about mathematical representation 
and the roles played by mathematical objects therein have led to philosophical 
misunderstandings regarding theories and theoretical entities. By offering a more 
promising account of mathematical structures in science, my Carnapian notion of 
framework also promises a more convincing and realistic way of understanding them. 
The specific ambition is to help repopularise the use of these frameworks in our 
philosophical reflections on science, for both science and philosophy stand to profit from 
it.
  15 
2 The explanatory role of mathematics in science 
Als ik zou willen dat je het begreep, had ik het wel beter uitgelegd. 
Johan Cruyff 
 
In light of the project for this dissertation outlined in the Introduction, my aim in this 
chapter is to investigate two proposals for the explanatory role of mathematics in 
representation that claim to account for all or the bulk of its contributions to science. The 
lure of an overarching framework of this kind is clear, for if we have at our disposal an 
account that can encapsulate the vast variety of the applications of mathematics to 
phenomena that appear to be explanatory, we can use it to make considerable headway in 
responding to question A posed in §1.1—How does mathematics assist in scientific 
representation? At a grander scale, such a framework would probably contribute 
invaluably to philosophical accounts of confirmation and questions concerning structural 
invariance across theories. This hope is founded on the quite reasonable assumption that a 
successful general account boasting such breadth would tie together or relate the varied 
applications of mathematics in a manner more amenable to a structured inquiry into these 
questions than otherwise. 
Philip Kitcher proposes an ambitious, holistic account of scientific and mathematical 
explanation that sees the unification of seemingly disparate phenomena, structures, and 
theories as the task of both. The accommodation in his proposal for a role for 
mathematics forms a major reason for my consideration of Kitcher’s account of 
explanation in §2.1: it draws heavily on important features of the covering law model of 
explanation of the logical empiricists but, unlike this and subsequent accounts of 
scientific explanation in the literature, such as that proposed by Salmon (1984), offers an 
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explicit explanatory role for mathematics as an indispensable part of scientific theories.1 
Bueno and Colyvan are concerned with a model that can represent all instances of the 
application of mathematics to the physical sciences. Consonant to the scale of the task, 
they claim that their mapping-based account yields copious rewards, of which a 
clarification of the explanatory role of mathematics in representation is but one. My 
examination of these accounts will reveal that neither succeeds in delivering on the 
promise of a comprehensive model of how mathematics is explanatory in science. 
Against Kitcher’s proposal, I present and examine in §2.2 and §2.3, respectively, 
Margaret Morrison’s claim that far from being relentless companions, explanation and 
unification tend to part ways in many instances where the mathematics involved is clearly 
functioning in an explanatory capacity. Bueno and Colyvan’s conception of the 
application of mathematics is found to be problematic in §2.5 because it neglects basic 
aspects of representation in applied mathematics, and hence is neither representative nor 
practicable. My analysis of these proposals will also seek to uncover a general way in 
which these accounts of mathematical explanation and application are found wanting. As 
we shall see in §2.6, the insight that this yields leads us to question B, posed in §1.1, as 
well as the manner in which it is addressed in Chapter 3. 
 
                                                 
1 It is also interesting to note in passing that Kitcher explicitly exonerates his account of explanation 
from a consideration of “idealisations” in science. This likely means that his model cannot accommodate 
mathematical explanations of the sort discussed by Batterman (1997, 2002). 
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2.1 Kitcher and explanation as unification 
Kitcher (1976, 1981, 1989) proposed his theory of scientific explanation in the 
backdrop of a series of criticisms that undermined the covering law model of explanation 
offered by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948, Hempel 1965). This model is based on the 
insight that explanation is derivation: specifically, it is the deductive or inductive 
derivation of a sentence describing a phenomenon to be explained—the explanandum—
by using a set of sentences, called the explanans, that contain at least one general law. 
This is harmonious with the claim by Carnap (1966, 7) that successful explanation 
inevitably requires an appeal to a general law. Not only is Kitcher sympathetic to these 
attempts to furnish a theory of scientific explanation, he adopts the view that an 
explanation assumes the form of a logical derivation. He then proposes a holistic model 
that encompasses scientific and mathematical explanation under the common principle of 
unification, i.e., the comprehension of a maximum number of facts and regularities 
through a minimum number of theoretical concepts and assumptions (1981, 508). In fact, 
Kitcher explicitly cites Feigl and Hempel as inspiration for the idea that explanation is 
nothing other than unification, and calls this the “unofficial view” of explanation 
harboured by the logical empiricists. 
Kitcher thinks that any purported account of scientific explanation should advance our 
understanding of phenomena and allow us to arbitrate in historical as well as 
contemporary disputes in science. The notion of unification can be easily linked to that of 
the enhancement of our understanding, as it presumably helps us discern how a diversity 
of phenomena may be the manifestations of the same underlying mechanism. Kitcher 
thinks that the most general problem of scientific explanation is to determine conditions 
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that must be met to answer an explanation-seeking question (1981, 510). Hence, he sees 
explanation as an activity that involves answering questions. An explanation is an 
ordered pair consisting of a proposition and an “act type.” This conceptualisation of 
explanation also clarifies its relevance to arguments: the ordered pair <p, explaining q> is 
an explanation when a sentence expressing p bears an appropriate relation to a particular 
argument provided by our scientific theories. 
The idea is to observe common “argument patterns” (1981, 516) appearing in a wide 
variety of scientific representations of diverse scientific systems. Kitcher thinks that our 
understanding of phenomena advances by repeatedly using the same patterns of argument 
in different representations, which shows us how to reduce the number of facts or 
assumptions that we have to accept as brute (1989, 432). Explanations are not evaluated 
separately, in isolation from one another, but by observing how they form part of a 
“systematic picture of nature.” They are hence ranked according to their role in a broad 
systematic group of derivations supplied by a particular theory. 
It is important to note that Kitcher makes an explicit connection between explanation 
in mathematics and the ways in which it functions in science (1989, 423). He claims that 
mathematical knowledge is similar to all other parts of scientific knowledge, and there is 
thus no reason for a methodological division between mathematics and the natural 
sciences, in particular with regard to the ways in which each is explanatory. This implies 
not only that this approach provides an account of explanation in mathematics as well as 
science (Kitcher 1989, 437), but also that the explanatory role of the mathematics used in 
scientific theories is evaluated using the same criterion of unification that is used to 
assess the explanatory strength of these theories. Hence, on Kitcher’s account, the only 
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difference between the explanatory contribution of mathematics to pure mathematics and 
that to representation in the sciences is the target domain in question: in mathematics, this 
domain is mathematical, such that no connection need be made or sought between the 
mathematical representation and a physical interpretation for it; in science, on the 
contrary, the domain being modelled is physical, and hence the mathematics needs to be 
suitably linked to it. 
Let K be a set of (sentences expressing) beliefs that is consistent and deductively 
closed. Kitcher encourages us to think of K as a set of statements endorsed by some ideal 
scientific community at some point in time. A set of arguments that derives some 
sentences in K from others in it is a “systematisation” of K (Mancosu 2011). The 
explanatory store over K—E(K)—is the optimal systematisation of our set of beliefs K, 
i.e., it is the set of sentences representing our knowledge that uses the fewest 
assumptions, or sets of arguments, to derive the largest set of conclusions. E(K) consists 
of arguments acceptable as the basis for acts of explanation by those whose beliefs are 
constituted by K. For each K, E(K) is the set of arguments that best unifies K. 
According to Kitcher, the manner in which the optimal explanatory set of arguments 
constituting our scientific knowledge, and hence the one that best unifies it, is determined 
is fairly complicated. At the same time, much of this formalism is intended to render the 
account tighter than the covering law model so that it does not fall prey to the same 
issues.2 In general, a theory unifies our beliefs when it provides one (or a few) patterns of 
argument that can be used to derive a large number of sentences that we accept (1981, 
514). The notion of argument pattern is crucial to explanatory unification, but requires a 
                                                 
2 See, for instance, Scriven (1959). 
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few preliminary definitions. A schematic sentence is an expression obtained by replacing 
some, but not necessarily all, non-logical expressions in a sentence with dummy letters. 
There is a set of directions called filling instructions for replacing the dummy letters in a 
schematic sentence such that for each dummy letter, there is a direction that tells us how 
it should be replaced. A schematic argument then is a sequence of schematic sentences. 
The classification for a schematic argument consists of a set of sentences describing the 
inferential characteristics of a schematic argument, i.e., it specifies the sentences that 
should be considered premises, those that are to be inferred from others through 
derivation, the rules of inference to be used, and so on. A general argument pattern is a 
triple consisting of i) a schematic argument, ii) a set of sets of filling instructions, 
containing a set of instructions for each term of the schematic argument, and iii) a 
classification for the schematic argument. 
Kitcher (1981, 517) uses an example of the popular formulation of Newton’s second 
law of motion to explicate the idea of an argument pattern and its role in unification. In 
the Principia, Newton had shown how to obtain the motion of bodies from knowledge of 
the forces acting on them. The unifying power of Newton’s work consisted in its 
demonstration that one pattern of argument could be used repeatedly to derive a wide 
range of accepted sentences. Consider a fusilier who wants to know why a gun attains 
maximum range when mounted at an angle of 45o to the horizontal on a flat plane. 
Kitcher thinks that the following general pattern of argument by Newton to treat one-
body systems can be used to answer this and a large variety of related questions through 
the following derivation: 
(1) The force on a is b. 
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(2) The acceleration of a is y. 
(3) Force = mass × acceleration. 
(4) (Mass of a) × (y) = b. 
(5) δ = ϑ. 
For the above, the filling instructions stipulate that the instances of “a” should be 
replaced by an expression referring to the body under consideration, those of “b” by an 
algebraic expression referring to a function of the variable coordinates and time, “y” 
should be replaced with an expression representing the acceleration of the body as a 
function of its coordinates and their time derivatives, “ϑ” by an expression referring to 
the variable coordinates of the body, and “δ” should be replaced by an explicit function 
of time.. Hence, the sentences that instantiate (5) reveal the dependence of the variable 
coordinates on time, and so provide specifications of the positions of the body in question 
throughout its motion. The classification of the argument, defined above, tells us that (1)-
(3) are premises, (4) is obtained from these by substitution, and (5) follows from (4) 
using algebraic manipulation and techniques of the calculus. It is thus the ability of the 
above argument pattern to allow us to represent a wide variety of physical systems and 
generate conclusions regarding them that renders it explanatory, insofar as it unifies. 
Analogously, the mathematical structure used above is explanatory because it can be 
repeatedly applied in varying situations to obtain a variety of conclusions (1989, 423). 
Although he concedes that arguments instantiating the Newtonian pattern above do not 
have identical logical structure, Kitcher thinks that the classification does impose 
conditions that ensure “similarity” of logical structure and non-logical vocabulary among 
such arguments. This is important because Kitcher claims that scientists are interested in 
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“stringent” patterns of arguments, which are patterns fairly similar in terms of their 
logical structure. Stringency is determined by conditions i) on the substitution of 
expressions for dummy letters, jointly imposed by the non-logical expressions in the 
pattern and the filling instructions, and those ii) on the logical structure imposed by the 
classification. A set of arguments is then said to be acceptable relative to K if and only if 
every argument in the set consists of a sequence of steps that accord with elementary 
valid rules of inferences, and the premises of each argument in the set belong to K. 
In consonance with the epistemic flavour of his account, Kitcher takes seriously the 
process by which we arrive at an explanatory store E(K) of knowledge that constitutes the 
best systematisation of our beliefs. If Σ is a set of arguments, a generating set for Σ is a 
set of argument patterns Π such that each argument in Σ is an instantiation of some 
pattern in Π. In determining the explanatory store E(K), we first narrow our choices to 
sets of arguments that are acceptable relative to K, and then consider, for each set of 
arguments, the various generating sets of patterns that are complete with respect to K. A 
generating set Π for argument set Σ is said to be complete with respect to K if and only if 
every argument that is acceptable relative to K and instantiates a pattern in Π belongs to 
Σ. 
Of the generating sets available to us in our body of knowledge, we choose the one 
with the greatest unifying power and call it the basis B of the set of arguments in 
question: 
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Figure 2.1. The derivation of basis sets on Kitcher's account of explanation (from Kitcher 1981, 520). 
The unifying power of a basis set B with respect to K varies directly with the size of 
the set of conclusions derived from it, the stringency of the patterns belonging to it, and 
the similarity among these patterns. On the above picture, explanation in the form of 
unification yields understanding, since by using a few patterns of argument to derive 
many beliefs, we minimise the number of types of premises we must admit as underived 
(Kitcher 1981, 520). Kitcher thinks it important to look closely at scientific practice to 
determine the arguments favoured by scientists and attempt to understand the patterns 
common to them. 
 
2.1.1 Explanation as unification at work: Natural selection 
The recurring historical instance used in Kitcher’s work to exemplify his account of 
explanation is Darwin’s theory of natural selection in the 19th century regarding the 
differential survival and reproduction of biological life. Darwin believed that natural 
selection should be accepted as the process by which species evolve because he thought 
that the “doctrine must sink or swim as it groups and explains phenomena” (Kitcher 
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1981, 514). However, he was unable to provide a complete derivation of any biological 
phenomenon. How, then, can natural selection be said to have any explanatory power? 
Kitcher thinks that Darwin’s evolutionary theory promised to unify a host of 
biological phenomena. The eventual unification proposed by his theory would consist in 
derivations of the descriptions of phenomena that would instantiate a common pattern. 
Kitcher supports this claim by observing that instead of providing detailed explanations 
for the presence of a particular trait in a particular species, Darwin provides a general 
pattern of argument that he claims can be instantiated in principle by a complete and 
rigorous derivation of the description of the characteristics that any species comes to 
exhibit over time. Such a derivation would employ the principle of natural selection as 
well as premises describing the relevant environment, the ancestral forms of the species 
under consideration, and the then-unknown laws of variation and inheritance. In other 
words, Darwin offers “explanation sketches” (Kitcher 1981, 515): by showing how a 
characteristic would be advantageous to a species, he indicates an explanation of the 
emergence of that characteristic in the species, hinting at an argument instantiating the 
general pattern. By using instantiations of this pattern, we can account for analogous 
variation in kindred species, the greater variability of specific characteristics, facts about 
their geographical distribution, and so on. Hence, Darwin though that his theory of 
natural selection should be accepted because it unifies and, thus, explains. 
 
2.2 The divisiveness of explanation 
Margaret Morrison (2000) has provided a fairly comprehensive critique of the 
identification of unification and explanation in the literature in philosophy of science, and 
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explicitly considers Kitcher’s account in the context of natural selection. Her general 
thesis is that there are many cases in the history of science where the demands for 
explanation and unification have militated in opposing directions, such that one has been 
rendered possible only at the expense of the other. Hence, explanation cannot be cast 
solely as unification, as Kitcher claims. Furthermore, a consideration of Morrison’s 
argument against Kitcher reveals an explanatory role for mathematics that cannot be 
accommodated by the latter’s proposal. 
Morrison concedes that the most successful unification in biology, the synthesis 
between evolutionary theory and Mendelian genetics, was accomplished by using 
particular mathematical structures that enabled geneticists to combine natural selection 
and Mendelianism under a common framework (2000, 192). However, in spite of this 
theoretical unity, there was no unanimously accepted explanatory model for the ways in 
which selection operated within this new synthesis. In fact, the evolutionary synthesis 
only successfully afforded explanation by introducing disunity at the level of models used 
in the application of population genetics to biological phenomena. That is, a diversity of 
models was needed to account for the processes and effects encountered in this domain, 
rather than a uniform pattern of argument. 
Kitcher claims that the argument pattern that he attributes to Darwin is implicit in his 
explanations of the prevalence of traits discussed in On the Origin of Species as well as 
other works. However, Morrison argues, although natural selection may serve to unify a 
wide range of phenomena on account of its applicability, it is not clear that it can also 
function as a source of explanation. Explanations based on derivation typically require a 
theoretical background to which one can appeal in order to understand how the 
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phenomena in question came about. They are invariably situated in larger theoretical 
contexts that can in turn explain why the relevant derivations work. In order for natural 
selection to be explanatory in a diversity of areas, several additional assumptions needed 
to be added to the theory, many of which were not grounded in evidence at the time. For 
instance, selection is not the only mechanism operating in Darwin’s evolutionary theory: 
there is the effect of use and disuse, spontaneous and directed variation (where the 
tendency to vary is transmitted rather than the actual variation), and so on. None of these 
involved selection, and could thus lead to maladaptive differentiation in local populations 
(Morrison 2000, 201). Hence, natural selection could only function in an explanatory 
manner in conjunction with specific assumptions, some of which lacked independent 
justification.  
Darwin wanted to show how natural selection and its evolutionary effects could be 
used to solve a host of problems in geology, palaeontology, geographical distribution, 
morphology, embryology, etc. If we consider his discussion of geographical distribution 
and his explanation for the inhabitants of the archipelago, we find, in addition to the 
selectionist claim, the introduction of crucial assumptions regarding the methods of 
transportation across long distances. Darwin justified these methods by claiming that they 
should be expected to occur rather than simply considered possible (Morrison 2000, 206). 
For instance, seeds could be transported for miles over oceans if embedded in driftwood, 
and birds blown by gales across the water would serve as quite effective transporters of 
seeds. Thus, each domain in which selection operates makes use of a specific model that 
incorporates assumptions of varying kinds, like the one above, in order to explain. On 
Kitcher’s criterion of the unity of a theoretical structure—where an argument pattern uses 
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the fewest premises or assumptions to generate the largest set of conclusions—these 
additional assumptions—the very ones that render natural selection-based models truly 
explanatory—detract from this unity. Hence, in such cases, natural selection could be 
explanatory only if these assumptions were satisfied: while it was necessary for the sort 
of explanation provided by Darwin, it was insufficient. Thus, natural selection could only 
function in an explanatory manner in conjunction with certain assumptions, contrary to 
Kitcher’s claim. 
 
2.2.1 How mathematical analogies may explain 
It is a good thing to have two ways of looking at a subject, and to admit that there are two ways of 
looking at it. 
(Maxwell, “On Faraday’s Lines of Force”) 
 
Pursuing the history of evolutionary theory, Morrison (2000, 218) shows that the 
synthesis between Mendelian genetics and Darwin’s evolutionary theory was only made 
possible through the isolation of mathematical structures common to them in the work of 
Fisher (1918, 1922) and others. Fisher was interested in the problem of how a large 
number of factors might separately affect genetic variability, and whether this could be 
statistically represented. He wanted to show, contra Pearson (1903), that an exact 
specification of each factor relevant to a given population was unnecessary for a 
representative statistical analysis: when these factors are sufficiently numerous, the most 
general assumptions with respect to separate peculiarities leads to the same statistical 
result. Fisher saw this as analogous to the methodology employed in the theory of ideal 
gases, where only general statistical laws regarding interactions among particles were 
needed to describe and predict the behaviour of gases. By the early 20th century, the 
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success of the kinetic theory of gases had shown that knowledge of the particular 
members of a population was not required to formulate representative, accurate, and 
general laws governing the behaviour of a population. Fisher thus treated biological 
populations as ideal gases. The benefit of this technique was that it provided the simplest 
account of a many-body system because it neglected as negligibly small the interactions 
among its members. This allowed Fisher to determine the role of natural selection in 
Mendelian populations by successfully isolating selection pressures from other relevant 
factors, such as migration, genetic recombination, and gene interaction, in order to render 
natural selection and Mendelian genetics compatible, and to show how the former 
operated in the latter. Tellingly, in his 1922 paper, Fisher used the law for the distribution 
of velocities of the particles of an ideal gas as the model for calculating the frequency 
ratios for different Mendelian populations. 
Morrison sees two ways in which the work of Fisher undermines Kitcher’s 
unificationist model of explanation. First, the mathematical analogy with ideal gases was 
the means by which Fisher was able to determine the effects of selection in isolation from 
other influences. This clarified the role of selection in genetic evolution in a manner 
considerably more informative and fruitful than the mere structural unification in the 
relevant argument pattern cited by Kitcher. Fisher was able to show how his assumption 
of a stochastic distribution yielded the conclusion that the action of natural selection on 
single genes, rather than mutation, random extinction, etc., was the primary determinant 
of evolution (Morrison 2000, 219). It is also important to note that in spite of the use of 
his analogy, Fisher did not propose or assume any identity between the actual 
mechanisms involved in the kinetic theory of gases and biological populations, which 
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would be the sort of epistemic unification demanded by Kitcher’s model. Second, it is not 
the case that Fisher used the analogy with ideal gases to justify his assumptions about 
biological populations; nor did he use it to explain empirical results that had been already 
available in hand. Instead, the mathematical analogy served as an instrument to 
investigate the role of selection in human populations by replacing actual populations 
with idealised ones. It should be clear that Kitcher’s rather narrow conception of 
explanation based on patterns of argument is not susceptible to accommodating such an 
elaborate mathematical analogy. The methodological decision to isolate natural selection 
as an independent factor in variation was ultimately justified on empirical grounds. Thus, 
while natural selection can have explanatory power, this cannot be understood solely in 
terms of its unifying power. It follows that there appears to be a difference between the 
unifying role of natural selection and its function as an explanatory hypothesis. More 
generally, while a theory such as natural selection can be explanatory, its ability to 
explain cannot be understood only in terms of its unifying power. Unification and 
explanation come apart. 
 
2.3 Reflections on Kitcher 
One of the virtues of Kitcher’s conception of science, and hence his account of 
explanation, is his explicitly epistemic approach to scientific knowledge. His proposed 
explanatory store of arguments represents the structured body of all our knowledge, and 
he encourages us to think of this as the product of the consensus of leading scientists in 
all areas. Similarly, he articulates criteria for the stringency of the argument patterns—in 
addition to formal demands for consistency, soundness, etc., that form part of the 
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covering law model—as a determinant of their eligibility for our explanatory store in 
order that only patterns that are appropriately unifying are admitted to it. At the same 
time, the argument by Morrison above highlights the inadequacy of his unification-based 
account by showing that the relationship between unification and explanation does not 
endure across the body of our scientific knowledge, and that the two are often torn 
asunder.  
More importantly, her account of Fisher’s work on unifying genetics and natural 
selection, by using a mathematical analogy between biological populations and particles 
of an ideal gas, provides another avenue where the mathematics employed in scientific 
representation helps clarify and explain phenomena. The use of analogies between the 
mathematical representation of one physical system and another in fact occupies a 
distinguished place in the history and practice of science. Among the earliest and most 
influential uses of this can be found in the work of James Clerk Maxwell on 
electromagnetism. In his 1861 paper “On Faraday’s lines of force,” Maxwell explicitly 
considers a “physical analogy” between fluid flow and electromagnetic phenomena.3 His 
purpose was to articulate Michael Faraday’s lines of force conception, which described 
the direction and intensity of all forces in a homogeneous field about a charged particle. 
Maxwell was here concerned with providing a mathematical formulation of these lines of 
forces. The analogy that he drew to this end was between the intensity and direction of a 
line of force at a point, and the flow of an incompressible fluid through a fine tube of 
variable section. This yielded a vector representation of the lines of force in terms of the 
                                                 
3 Maxwell (1965, 157) credits Lord Kelvin for first using this method to draw an analogy between heat 
and electrostatics, and light and the vibrations of an elastic medium. 
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velocity field of a fluid. Maxwell then applied this analogy to the phenomena of static 
electricity, galvanic current, permanent magnetism, magnetic induction, and 
electromagnetic induction: that is, he derived representations of almost all 
electromagnetic phenomena using the analogy with ideal fluid flow. This motivated his 
subsequent and more important physical analogies in his “On the physical lines of force” 
in 1862, where he found the correct field equations for electromagnetism and calculated 
the velocity of the transmission of electromagnetic interactions to be approximately equal 
to the speed of light. 
It is important here to recognise the similarity between Maxwell’s use of the 
mathematical analogy between electromagnetic phenomena and fluid flow and Fisher’s 
groundbreaking work in relating natural selection with Mendelian genetics. Much as 
Fisher did not identify biological populations with the particles of an ideal gas, Maxwell 
does not assume an identity of any kind between fluid flow and electromagnetic 
phenomena. In fact, he repeatedly insists on the deceptiveness of this appearance and, at 
least in the first part of the 1861 paper, makes no claim about the physical nature of the 
phenomena being modelled. His explicit aim there is to provide a mathematical 
description of the lines of force conception, and he eschews the position of a “physical 
theory” to ground this mathematical description. One of the many important 
consequences of this work was the recognition that under certain restrictive conditions, 
the equations of ideal fluid flow are identical in form to those governing electromagnetic 
phenomena. In fact, this insight is still used to solve a number of problems in 
electrostatics to this day. I will have more to say about this in my treatment in §2.5 of the 
account of the application of mathematics proposed by Bueno and Colyvan. But for now, 
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it is important to see how this method of mathematical analogy is unavailable to Kitcher 
on his model of explanation, and serves to rob his unificationist account of the 
comprehensiveness required of an all-encompassing theory. Since Kitcher sees scientific 
and mathematical contributions to explanation solely through the lens of unification, the 
argument patterns that he proposes to capture this contribution consist of an optimised 
formal rendition of our ever-growing body of scientific knowledge, where the 
optimisation consists in the generation of the largest set of conclusions using the smallest 
set of premises. However, as is clear from the above, insofar as epistemic and structural 
unification is not the only explanatory contribution of mathematics or science, Kitcher’s 
model cannot capture these contributions on account of a structural myopia grounded in 
the major assumptions of his view of explanation. The major virtue that he espouses for 
his account of explanation—unification—becomes its major handicap. 
With regard to the example of natural selection, Kitcher can reasonably claim that 
selection as proposed by Darwin is in fact explanatory. If accepted in conjunction with 
the other requisite assumptions highlighted by Morrison above, regarding the 
geographical distribution of species, their morphology, and so on, natural selection does 
provide an arguably satisfactory explanation, at least for its time, of the evolution and 
propagation of species. It shows how, given that natural selection is true4 and the other 
assumptions are admitted, species evolve over time due to a wide variety of genetic, 
environmental, and other factors. Be that as it may, the point is that a subsequent, 
significantly richer explanation was afforded in Fisher’s work by employing the 
                                                 
4 I purposely use this word, in spite of my reservations against this as the sole aim of any physical 
theory, because this is required of the premises of arguments in Kitcher’s model. 
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mathematical analogy described above. Using his model, Fisher was able to determine 
the independent effect of each of a multitude of environmental and genetic variables on 
the evolution of biological populations. Similarly, using his fluid flow analogy with 
electric and magnetic phenomena, Maxwell was able to provide a mathematical 
formulation for Faraday’s theory that led to his equations of electromagnetism and 
yielded a useful methodology to conceptualise problems in a variety of disciplines for the 
future.  
Another reason for why the avenue of mathematical analogy, employed to great 
success by these scientists, is simply not admissible to Kitcher’s account is that his 
proposal emphasises patterns of argument, and is hence founded on the notion of 
derivation. The ultimate arbiter of the success of any explanation of such a theory—one 
that casts all explanations as arguments—is the soundness of the argument encapsulating 
a given explanation. In addition to satisfying a valid form, an argument of this sort is thus 
required to have true premises. However, as mentioned above, there is nothing ostensibly 
true about the mathematical analogies used by Fisher and Maxwell above, which were 
marshalled nonetheless to great explanatory and scientific success. We know that for 
Kitcher, the explanatory store of argument patterns that we can bring to bear upon a 
phenomenon in order to explain it comprises the beliefs of scientists and other 
epistemological experts in society; hence, all these patterns encapsulate truths about the 
world. That is to say, there is no room in these patterns, due to their stringency, for 
unsound arguments containing assumptions that are known to be false, such as 
mathematical analogies, that we know form a critical part of the so-called toolkit of an 
applied mathematician in solving problems in engineering. Kitcher’s account betrays an 
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emphasis on truth in the course of representation that thus impoverishes his account by 
denying it resources available to someone who privileges the ability to represent over 
truth in scientific investigation. And this is reflected in the limitedness of his view of 
explanation. 
 
2.4 The inferential conception of applied mathematics 
Otavio Bueno and Mark Colyvan (2011) have recently proposed an account of the 
application of mathematics to phenomena. The motivation underlying their “inferential 
conception of applied mathematics” is that embedding features of the empirical world 
into a mathematical structure allows us to draw inferences that would be otherwise 
difficult to obtain. Bueno and Colyvan frame their inferential account as an extension of 
and improvement on the “mapping account” of the application of mathematics proposed 
by Christopher Pincock (2004, 2007) and others.5  
Pincock considers cases involving a mapping of some sort between a physical and a 
mathematical domain such that it yields an “abstract explanation,” one that mainly relies 
on the structural features of the physical system in question (2007, 257). He considers as 
instance of this the problem of the famous bridges of the city of Königsberg. Some 
preliminary graph theory is first in order. A graph is an ordered pair consisting of vertices 
and edges. The path of a graph is a series of edges where one of the vertices in the nth 
edge overlaps with one of these in the n + 1th edge. Connected graphs have a path 
between any two vertices. The number of edges on a vertex is called its degree. A 
                                                 
5 They attribute variants of this approach to Baker (2003), Balaguer (1998), and Leng (2002). 
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connected graph G is said to be Eulerian just in case it is connected and contains a path, 
from an initial vertex v, that features each edge exactly once and ends at v. 
Figure 1 shows a map of the seven bridges of Königsberg. The question is whether it 
is possible, starting at any given bridge, to traverse all bridges exactly once and return to 
the origin—if an Eulerian path is possible. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. The bridges of Königsberg. 
We can represent the bridges as a graph by abstracting from the details that are 
irrelevant to the problem at hand—the material constitution of the bridges, their 
elevation, the distance between any pairs of them, and so on—and by considering the 
bridges as edges, and the banks and islands as vertices. This yields the simple graph 
shown in Fig. 2. Now, we know that according to a theorem of graph theory, the 
existence of Eulerian circuits requires that all vertices of a graph have an even degree. As 
shown in Fig. 2, on the contrary, each of the vertices of the graph representing the bridges 
of Königsberg has an odd degree. This allows us to conclude that it is impossible for 
anyone to cross all bridges exactly once and return to the origin (Pincock 2007, 258). If 
someone were to ask how we can confirm, in particular without attempting traversals, 
  36 
that a Eulerian path is not possible, we would point to the isomorphism between the 
relevant features of the bridges and the graph to claim that the graph is sufficiently 
representative of the bridges to the extent required for our purposes. Having secured the 
consent of our interlocutor6 to the isomorphism, we can then invoke the above theorem of 
graph theory and claim that this holds for the bridges as well, insofar as the mapping is 
representative. To clarify our reasoning, we can show other, Eulerian, graphs 
representing possible bridges where such a traversal is possible. This allows us to 
conclude that, as in our representative graph, the number of paths or bridges connecting 
any two vertices or parts of the city determines that a path of the kind we sought is not 
possible. 
                                                 
6 I should point out here that Pincock and other proponents of the mapping account do not frame their 
proposals in such a context of accountability. I purposely use language here that evokes a view of 
explanation that requires that it somehow be confirmed as competent by an evaluator, preferably a lay one. 
My initial impression is that this is not mutually exclusive with the possibility of the development of formal 
measures to this end. The major inspiration for this idea is Gregory Vlastos’s (1993) very creative work on 
the Socratic elenchus, and a central feature of the method of investigation advertised by Socrates in what 
are considered “early” Platonic dialogues: Charmides, Crito, Euthydemus, Euthyphro, Gorgias, Hippias 
Major, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, Lysis, and Protagoras (see Vlastos (1991)). 
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Figure 2.3. The bridges of Königsberg rendered as a simple graph. 
This, then, is an instance of a static (time-invariant) system where an abstract 
explanation is afforded by the mathematics through a mapping from the phenomena at 
hand. It is important to note that this mapping captures only the features of the bridge 
system relevant to the problem being considered—whether an Eulerian traversal is 
possible—and ignores a host of other details—the constitution of the bridges, their 
microphysical properties, and so on—that do not contribute to the investigation. Hence, 
mathematics can be used to supply explanations of phenomena that are dependent solely 
on the abstract structural features of the system in question. Such representations have 
also been referred to as “acausal” (Pincock 2012, §3.3).7 
                                                 
7 The reader should note here that in calling such representations “acausal,” I do not intend to suggest 
that I subscribe to any “causal” representations in the pre-theoretic, metaphysically repugnant sense of the 
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It is in the context of this mapping account of the application of mathematics that 
Bueno and Colyvan propose their inferential conception. They agree with Pincock’s 
contention that a variety of mappings from the phenomena to representative mathematical 
structures are crucial to applied mathematics. However, they think the mapping account 
is incomplete because it does not say much about the kinds of mappings that can be 
effected between a physical system and a mathematical structure. Specifically, it cannot 
accommodate the fact that mathematical theories often have more structure than the 
target empirical setup in any given situation and, when suitably interpreted, some of this 
mathematical structure has empirical implications (Bueno and Colyvan 2011, 356).  
To address this shortcoming in the mapping account, Bueno and Colyvan propose an 
account of applied mathematics that accommodates the central features of the application 
process, including the mapping of mathematical structures to a physical one (2011, 346). 
The crucial feature of this account is that it captures the important fact that the 
fundamental role of the application of mathematics to physical systems is inferential: by 
embedding certain features of the empirical world into a mathematical structure, it is 
possible to obtain inferences that would otherwise be extraordinarily difficult, if not 
impossible (Bueno and Colyvan 2011, 352). They claim that all roles of mathematics in 
science involve the ability to establish inferential relations between phenomena and 
mathematical structures, or among mathematical structures themselves. They are careful 
to point out that their account is not a purely structural account, since it makes room for 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
word. The term “acasual representation” seems to have stuck. So I use it only because this is what it has 
come to be known in the literature (See, for instance, Räz (2014)). 
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pragmatic and context-dependent features in applying mathematics to phenomena (Bueno 
and Colyvan 2011, 8). 
 
 
Figure 2.4. The inferential conception of applied mathematics (from Bueno and Colyvan (2011, 353)). 
The inferential conception consists of the following three steps (Bueno and Colyvan 
2011, 9): 
1. Immersion. This involves a mapping from the physical setup to a convenient 
mathematical structure.8 Bueno and Colyvan recognise that not all elements of a 
physical situation may be relevant to the purposes of the application in question, 
and hence stress that the mapping might omit certain structural features of the 
physical setup. Furthermore, the empirical setup is assumed to have structure, i.e., 
it either naturally has structure suited to the establishment of a mapping with a 
mathematical structure, or an appropriate one can be imposed on it. The latter 
may be a non-trivial exercise. The point of this step is to relate the relevant 
                                                 
8 Bueno and Colyvan (2011, 347) offer a fairly inclusive definition of “structure” as a set of objects 
(nodes or propositions) with a set of relations on them. 
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aspects of the empirical situation with the appropriate mathematical 
context/structure. 
2. Derivation. The mathematical structure obtained as a result of the mapping is then 
employed to derive consequences. 
3. Interpretation. The mathematical consequences obtained in the derivation stage 
are then interpreted in terms of the initial empirical setup. A mapping from the 
mathematical structure (obtained in Derivation) to the initial empirical setup is 
needed to establish an interpretation. This need not simply be the inverse of the 
mapping used in Immersion. 
Bueno and Colyvan emphasise that the above distinction between an empirical setup 
and a mathematical structure does not imply that the former is free of mathematics or 
other formalism. On the contrary, they claim that a representation of the empirical setup 
in practice will very often invoke a great deal of mathematics. The mappings are obtained 
by using partial homomorphisms between the relevant theoretical and mathematical 
structures, with partial isomorphisms between the theoretical9 structures and those closer 
to the phenomena, down to structures directly representing appearances (Bueno and 
French 2012, 2). Partial structures are used in the setup in order to cater to the need for a 
formal structure that deals adequately with the openness and incompleteness of 
information involved in scientific practice. 
Bueno and Colyvan cite several reasons for viewing their proposal as an improvement 
over the mapping account of Pincock. They think that the detail they provide enables 
                                                 
9 “Theoretical” here is identical to the “physical” or “empirical” setup in the Immersion step. 
Presumably, the physical setup will, from the beginning, be an abstraction from the real world, will contain 
only relevant details, and may also incorporate theoretical entities, e.g., electrons. 
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their inferential conception of the application of mathematics to unify disparate theories, 
make novel prediction, and facilitate mathematical explanation.10 With regard to the 
latter, they claim that the establishment of inferential relations between mathematical 
structures and the empirical setup is crucial to mathematical explanations of phenomena 
(2011, 366). It seems that the Immersion and Interpretation steps are important for 
mathematical explanation, since these steps involve what Bueno and Colyvan call 
“inferential relations.” It is unclear how they intend for the inferential conception to be 
explanatory. It seems that on their account, a mathematically viable interpretation of the 
physical domain—in Immersion—and a physically coherent understanding of the 
mathematical results—presumably in Interpretation, once the derivations have been 
made—can contribute to an account of explanation of the phenomena that invokes the 
relevant mathematical structures. Thus, the view seems to be that the mappings will 
feature as necessary constituents in the formulation of an explanation of the phenomena. 
In sum, Bueno and Colyvan think that their account enables the conceptualisation of 
two central issues in the application of mathematics to science: i) selecting appropriate 
mathematical structures to represent the empirical setup, and ii) assessing the 
representational and, perhaps, explanatory adequacy of these structures (2011, 356). 
 
                                                 
10 I will not describe how they think their account accomplishes each of these because my criticism 
undermines the very applicability of their proposed structure to problems in applied scientific reasoning. If 
successful, such a strategy undermines any claim that they make regarding its fruitfulness for science. 
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2.5 The applicability of the inferential conception 
I think it uncontroversial that there is some truth to the sort of mapping account 
described in the foregoing. If I ask you to divide 97 tomatoes among 10 people such that 
each person gets a whole number of tomatoes and the same number of tomatoes, you will 
not need to experiment with attempts to effect such a distribution and fail in order to 
conclude that this is impossible. In this and countless such instances, an isomorphism is 
assumed (typically not consciously, perhaps) between a certain set of numbers (the 
natural numbers from 1 to 97 in this case) and the target system in the physical world. Be 
that as it may, the account of the application of mathematics proposed by Bueno and 
Colyvan is far more ambitious than proposing to account for mental arithmetic. My 
treatment of it in the following will seek to emphasise the fact that this account of applied 
mathematics fails because it overlooks the basic details in scientific practice that enable 
frameworks of representation to model scenarios in the first place. Hence, the inferential 
conception as proposed by Bueno and Colyvan is in fact inapplicable to most such 
contexts. 
Recently, Erik Curiel (2012) has convincingly argued that an adequate semantics for a 
physical theory must be based on notions of meaning that are determined prior to 
concerns regarding the accuracy with which the theory represents the dynamical 
behaviour of the physical systems that it treats. Following scientific practice, Curiel 
proposes distinguishing between the kinematical and dynamical components of a theory 
in its representation. Roughly, kinematical components are features of a system that are 
constant, or are assumed to be so for the sake of argument or analysis, as the system 
evolves over time, on pain of the system transforming into another in the representation. 
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On the other hand, dynamical components are quantities of the system that can vary with 
time and place. Kinematics comprises all that one needs to know in order to fix the kind 
of system in question (Curiel 2012, 9) and imposes constraints on the possible range of 
values of the relevant quantities in order to be able to provide a complete description of 
the system with regard to the representation at hand. For instance, there are several 
different physical systems that contain shear and stress, e.g., Nävier–Stokes fluids, 
electromagnetic fields, elastic solids, etc. To merely claim that a system has a shear-stress 
tensor is far from sufficient to characterise it in a manner that will allow a meaningful 
representation of it. One also needs to know whether the tensor is symmetric or 
divergence free, or if it stands in some relation to another quantity of the system, such as 
heat or flux (Curiel 2012, 10). These constitute part of the system’s kinematical 
constraints. 
Recall from §2.4 that the inferential conception of Bueno and Colyvan consists of 
three stages: a mapping is established between the target physical setup and a suitable 
mathematical structure in Immersion, the mathematics thus obtained is manipulated in the 
Derivation stage to obtain results, and these are then interpreted in terms of the original 
physical setup in the Interpretation phase. Hence, it is evident that Bueno and Colyvan 
propose reinterpreting the mathematical structure, which is derived by purely formal 
manipulation of the structure abstracted from the initial empirical setup, in terms of the 
physical setup once the necessary derivations have been made from it. Presumably, the 
underlying idea is that a reinterpretation of the formalism in question is provided once it 
has been used to derive consequences purporting to have physical significance. Such a 
view of representation is unfeasible as it is unrepresentative of scientific practice. This is 
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because an interpretation of the formalism obtained by derivation requires, among other 
things, the prior stipulation of the types of systems and the sorts of conditions for which 
the system of equations (the formalism) at hand would be adequate. Without this having 
been done at the outset, before using the formalism to derive any consequences, it is 
impossible to know the sorts of derivations that are and are not reasonable to make in the 
context of the interpretation, since a given system of equations can be manipulated in any 
number of ways depending on the objective at hand. In such a case, it would not be 
possible to distinguish, without prior interpretation of the formalism, the parts of it with 
actual physical significance from those that have none in the context in question. 
However, Bueno and Colyvan do recognize that the initial empirical or physical setup, 
from which the mathematical structure is obtained in Immersion, may itself be fairly 
formal and will very often involve “a great deal of mathematics” (2011, 354) that will 
presumably have been interpreted at that stage. Given that the consequences obtained in 
Derivation are subsequently reinterpreted in terms of this highly mathematised initial 
empirical setup, Bueno and Colyvan can claim that the requisite part of the formalism is 
in fact interpreted prior to derivation. And after all, the principle of charity requires that 
their proposal be viewed in its strongest viable manifestation. 
Nonetheless, such a response is unsatisfactory. It is important to point out that Bueno 
and Colyvan market their inferential conception as an improvement over the mapping 
account proposed by Pincock et al. Their major criticism of this family of accounts, and a 
feature that they claim is corrected in their proposal, is that it is vague with regard to the 
details of the establishment of relations between phenomena and formal structures. 
Insofar as this is the case, there is by implication an onus on them to show how their 
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account is detailed in precisely the ways in which they fault the proponents of the 
mapping account for being vague. Furthermore, the criticism made above regarding the 
inevitable role of interpretation in our derivations runs deeper. As Rizza (2013) has 
recently pointed out, while the corresponding mapping between an empirical structure 
and a mathematical structure can play an important role in representation, the applicative 
relevance of a mere mapping is secondary to and, more importantly, contingent upon the 
isolation of relevant formal properties of the empirical structure and their use as 
constraints on the mathematical structure corresponding to it. This is to say two things. 
First, the isolation and selection of salient formal properties characteristic of an empirical 
structure are tasks that are non-trivial. Insofar as Bueno and Colyvan do not say much 
more about the initial empirical setup in their account than that it might be highly 
mathematised, to conclude thus that this empirical setup accounts for the considerations 
offered above would be akin to largesse rather than charity. Second, such “kinematical” 
constraints cannot be defined in terms of mappings because the scientist is required to 
acquit himself/herself of this task before the “immersion” of the physical setup into a 
mathematical model. Since Bueno and Colyvan do not even gesture in general at 
interpretive work required to obtain a coherent empirical setup that is conducive to 
subsequent moves in their account, it is unreasonable to attribute to them a sophisticated 
view of this stage of representation generation. Thus, the inferential account must contain 
a specific articulation of detailed mapping-independent steps in order to determine the 
constraints on the system at hand, which in turn would enable it to represent physical 
systems in the first place. Otherwise, it is fair to claim that adherence to the inferential 
conception leads us to a situation, corresponding to the Interpretation step, where we 
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have made a number of derivations that may or may not represent the target physical 
system because the quantities that need to be defined and the constraints that need to be 
imposed on their range of values have not been specified. 
A related objection regarding the lack of interpretive detail in the inferential 
conception can be described as follows: Consider the equations of electrostatics with a 
dielectric: 
E = – ∇ ⋅       (2.1) 
∇  . (κ . ∇ϕ) = −ρfree / e0    (2.2) 
where ϕ represents scalar potential. Equations of the same form have been found to 
represent and solve a litany of simple problems in various branches of physics, such as 
irrotational fluid flow, steady heat flow, certain problems in mechanical engineering, the 
diffusion of neurons, and certain areas of optics. In every problem scenario in each of 
these areas, the scientist is faced with an empirical situation that needs to be modelled. 
The outcome is a set of equations representing the physical situation at hand. This 
presumably occurs in Immersion on Bueno and Colyvan’s model. Bracketing the above 
objection regarding the extent of interpretation required at this stage in the face of Bueno 
and Colyvan’s disregard of it, the scientist is then required to derive this form from the 
set of equations generated in Immersion. The important mathematical similarity among 
the solutions of these systems is the satisfaction of Laplace’s equation ∇ 2 . ϕ = 0. This 
would occur in the Derivation phase of the inferential conception. The result would be a 
set of equations in the same form as Eqs. (2.1) and (2.2) that solves the system in 
question. However, in the course of manipulating the equations of the system generated 
in Immersion to obtain the harmonic functions that would solve it, the scientist frequently 
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needs to refer to the interpreted physical scenario during Derivation. This is to ensure 
that he/she makes mathematical inferences that continue to be representative of the 
situation at hand—say, a case of irrotational fluid flow—while looking to reduce the 
equations to harmonic functions in order to render them solvable. However, Bueno and 
Colyvan’s model does not accommodate this alternation between Derivation and the 
empirical situation (or Immersion, depending upon how structured the consequence of 
this phase is). Insofar as this alternation is necessary to solve all but the simplest 
problems in applied mathematics, the inferential conception appears to be unsuited to 
accurately account for the application of mathematics because it misses a structural detail 
of the process that is crucial to application. This disregard of scientific practice manifests 
itself as a general failure, by many in the philosophical literature, to appreciate the 
interplay between theory and experimentation in Chapter 3, when I present and defend a 
Carnapian conception of mathematical entities in representational systems in science. 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
The preceding sections reveal an error common to Kitcher’s unificationist model of 
explanation as well as Bueno and Colyvan’s inferential conception: a failure to account 
for a number of contributions of mathematics to representation due to structural 
deficiencies in their proposals. By “structural deficiencies,” I simply mean that the 
frameworks for representation proposed in both these accounts are too restrictive to 
accommodate a number of explanatory contributions as seen in historical as well as 
contemporary instances of the application of mathematics. In the case of Kitcher, his 
proposed argument patterns to formally represent our scientific knowledge are designed 
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to admit only instances where scientific inquiry, and the relevant mathematics, appears to 
unify disparate phenomena. As a consequence, we saw in §2.2 and §2.3 how this view 
cannot accommodate Fisher’s seminal mathematical work that synthesised genetics and 
natural selection by using the familiar technique of making mathematical analogies 
between diverse physical systems, or Maxwell’s use of the analogy with ideal fluid flow 
to model electromagnetic phenomena. Structural deficiency is even more pronounced in 
Bueno and Colyvan’s proposal, which is simply incorrect in its assumptions about how 
physical systems are modelled. As I have argued in §2.5, this is because it completely 
ignores the interpretive work needed to establish an empirical setup that is capable of 
even representing, let alone accurately modelling, the target system. 
The common error of structural shortcomings in the face of practical instances of 
mathematical representation suggests that any philosophical account purporting to 
explicate the various contributions of mathematics to science ought to at least faithfully 
reflect the structure of our scientific theories. Specifically, it should explicate the 
relationships among the theoretical/mathematical apparatus that it employs and outline 
clear procedures for their interpretation. Furthermore, it should take cognisance of the 
ways in which theory is related to experimental procedures for its verification, as well as 
the manner in which it is used to solve real-world problems. Such a framework would be 
more likely to accurately capture the details of scientific reasoning of the sort that are 
overlooked by the accounts examined in this chapter. This observation prompts question 
B posed in §1.1— Is there a promising philosophical account available to represent the 
theoretical/mathematical entities employed in our scientific theories in order to help 
clarify and explain their role? The linguistic frameworks for the reconstruction of 
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scientific theories proposed by Carnap appear to satisfy this requirement. This is because 
as Stein (1992, 1994) has pointed out, these frameworks are modelled after the highly 
mathematised structure of canonical theories in physics, with a clear distinction between 
theoretical and observational vocabularies, the relationship between which is mediated by 
rules of correspondence. Hence, in Chapter 3, I propose and defend frameworks for the 
representation of theoretical entities in science that are based on Carnap’s proposal, but 
deviate from it in detail. 
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3 Carnapian frameworks for mathematical entities 
 
My examination of the accounts of mathematical explanation in Chapter 2 was 
intended to highlight some of the contributions of mathematics to scientific 
representation. In addition to discharging this burden, my inquiry revealed that Kitcher’s 
unificationist account and the inferential conception of Bueno and Colyvan fail to 
accommodate many explanatory contributions of mathematics to science because of 
varying structural limitations and shortcomings. The upshot was that a scheme that can 
competently reflect the role of mathematics in representation ought to be amenable to the 
mathematical structure of theories in physics. This prompts the second of the research 
questions for this dissertation stated in §1.1— Is there a promising philosophical account 
available to represent the theoretical/mathematical entities employed in our scientific 
theories in order to help clarify and explain their role? In response to this challenge, I 
argue in this chapter that a modified form of the linguistic frameworks for the 
philosophical analysis of theoretical entities proposed by Carnap is competent to 
represent mathematical entities in just this role. The modifications I propose to such 
frameworks—what renders my proposal Carnapian—are three:  
i) The position of a semantic view for the representation of theories, whereby a 
theory is taken to be a family of models rather than a set of sentences, as in the 
syntactic view of Carnap (§3.2). 
ii) The proposal and pursuit of a methodology based on a careful, detailed 
“bottom-up” consideration of instances of the use of theory in representing 
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target systems, in contrast to the traditional philosophical approach based on a 
priori concerns or toy examples (§3.2 and §3.6). 
iii) A consideration of the practical complexity of relating theory to experimental 
data (§3.7). 
I outline in §3.1 the major commitments shared by my proposed Carnapian view with 
Carnap’s own account of linguistic frameworks. In §3.2, I attend to some preliminary 
considerations and explain the first two of my amendments to Carnap’s framework for 
theoretical entities. Section 3.3 features a detailed consideration of criticisms of Carnap’s 
account of theoretical entities in his reconstructive frameworks. The general strategy 
pursued in all these is to show that Carnap’s approach leads to consequences for scientific 
theories that are counter-intuitive or outright false, is unrepresentative of scientific 
practice, and hence must be rejected. While I consider and address objections from a 
number of thinkers, my discussion centres on criticisms made by Pincock, since these 
satisfactorily encapsulate the concerns expressed by the others and explicitly engage the 
question of whether Carnapian frameworks can capture scientific practice. In order to 
better understand the context of the concerns and the nature of a possible response in the 
spirit of Carnap, I will briefly summarise in §3.4 his mature view of the theoretical 
language in his framework. It should be noted here that my amendments to Carnap above 
are consistent with this view. Given the strategy underlying the criticisms of Carnap, it 
would be argumentatively effective and efficient to consider an instance of the 
application of a Carnapian framework to a physical theory. I will thus provide in §3.5 an 
example from the history of science—Maxwell’s equations of electromagnetism—and 
consider it in the backdrop of Carnapian frameworks in §3.6 to show that these concerns 
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are unjustified. My responses to these concerns reveal insights into how Carnapian 
frameworks are representative of scientific practice. They also unearth the third way, 
stated above, in which my approach to frameworks for scientific reconstruction diverges 
from that of Carnap. I briefly sketch this in §3.7. 
 
3.1 Major points of agreement with Carnap 
Carnap has provided the most comprehensive and systematic programme in 
philosophy for the rational reconstruction of science. The aim of his enterprise is to 
articulate scientific theories in a manner that reveals hidden assumptions by clarifying the 
multiplicity of relations involved in their construction and regimentation. To my mind, 
this accounts offers considerable promise for the use of philosophy as both a servant and 
critic of scientific theorising and practice. Hence, I will dedicate the remainder of this 
chapter to clarifying and defending an account of the role of theoretical entities in science 
in the spirit of Carnap’s enterprise in general, and largely in accord with his mature view 
(1934, 1956, 1966) of this issue in particular. I write “theoretical entities” instead of 
“mathematics” because the debate in the philosophical literature has been carried out in 
these terms. However, it should be clear that insofar this dissertation has emphasised 
theories in physics, and since theoretical entities in our physical theories are rendered in 
the language of mathematics, an investigation of the role of such entities should be 
considered part of an inquiry into the mathematics employed in the relevant theories. 
It is pertinent at this point to briefly highlight the major tenets of Carnap’s programme 
that are retained in my Carnapian approach, over and above my subscription to his 
mature view of theoretical entities in linguistic frameworks detailed in §3.4. This is 
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particularly relevant because each of the following subscriptions plays an important role 
in the arguments that I mount in this and the next chapter, either as assumptions (as with 
the analytic–synthetic distinction in §4.4) or as commitments that are defended against 
criticisms in the literature (as with the criterion of cognitive significance in §3.3). First, 
my Carnapian conception endorses its eponym’s distinction between analytic and 
synthetic propositions in the context of formal frameworks for science. There are many 
formulations of this distinction in the philosophical literature. With regard to frameworks 
for scientific theories, the distinction translates into one between propositions that can be 
verified or falsified without reference to empirical data and those that cannot. This is in 
contrast to Quine’s (1951) famous rejection of this division, and his view that no 
distinction in kind can be made between the a priori and the a posteriori in our formalised 
epistemology. As we shall see in §4.4, it is adherence to the analytic–synthetic distinction 
that permits Carnap to pose and answer questions concerning the formal/mathematical 
components of reconstructed theories as internal to his frameworks, and to reject 
ontological questions concerning theoretical entities as questions without content that are 
external to them. Second, the Carnapian view remains faithful to Carnap’s criterion of 
cognitive significance as formulated in his later works, and described in §3.4. Roughly, 
this holds that a proposition is meaningful just in case it is in principle verifiable or 
falsifiable. In light of the analytic–synthetic distinction endorsed above, the criterion of 
cognitive significance provides two kinds of mechanisms for the verification of 
propositions within a framework: formal proof in the case of purely logical and 
mathematical propositions, and empirical verification in the case of synthetic 
propositions. I defend this criterion against influential criticisms in the literature in §3.5 
  54 
and §3.6 by using Maxwell’s equations of electromagnetism as an instance. Furthermore, 
in §4.4, I use the distinction between these two methods of verification to address 
concerns shared by Demopoulos and Maddy regarding the viability of Carnap’s attitude 
to ontological questions regarding theoretical entities in linguistic frameworks. The third 
such notable commitment of the Carnapian conception of theoretical entities is 
harmonious with a revision by Carnap to his early work. Long before he espoused his 
mature view of theoretical terms in linguistic frameworks, Carnap had abandoned his 
ambition for a single unified language for all of science, and had begun exploring 
alternative frameworks for the representation of the structure of particular theories.1 In 
the backdrop of his view of philosophy as the logic of science, this stance allows me to 
propose and defend in the remainder of this chapter Carnapian frameworks for the 
analysis of theoretical entities in a manner useful to science and philosophy. The 
usefulness of this perspective is exemplified by my use of Carnapian frameworks to 
represent Maxwell’s work. 
The final significant debt that my Carnapian view owes to Carnap is also the most 
tentative. It is the claim that the aim of such frameworks is the reconstruction of scientific 
theories. For Carnap, the primary task of philosophy is to make explicit the various 
assumptions made by scientists in formulating theories in order to clarify the 
methodological and epistemological commitments entailed by them. Hence, as 
frameworks of reconstruction, Carnapian systems are not intended for use by practicing 
scientists in the so-called context of discovery, but to be employed by philosophers 
                                                 
1
 This assumes the form of his “Principle of Tolerance” in The Logical Syntax of Language, whereby 
one is free to use the framework of one’s choice for the representation of theories so long as the rules 
invoked and the methods used are clearly articulated (Carnap 1937, 52). 
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following the establishment and acceptance of theories in order to analyse them. 
Scientists do not know of or care about Carnapian frameworks, and certainly do not use 
them. Nonetheless, I have said that my subscription to this component of Carnap’s 
programme is tentative. By this, I mean that in the context of my argument in this 
chapter, and my project in this dissertation, I continue to subscribe to the thesis that 
Carnapian frameworks are fundamentally reconstructive in their intended application and 
should not be burdened with the onus of being attractive or useful to scientists engaged in 
cutting-edge research.2 At the same time, beyond the scope and aims of this dissertation, I 
do not see a principled reason for restricting Carnapian frameworks solely to 
reconstructive enterprises. It appears that scientists in many fields already use some 
implicit form of proto-Carnapian frameworks in their research. But over and above this 
cursory observation, I see three ways in which some scientists would benefit from the use 
of a more explicit framework along the lines developed by Carnap in their work.3 
i. In the case of mathematical physics, scientists working on algebraic quantum 
field theory, for instance, or those engaged in more or less strictly 
mathematical problems, such as characterising formal properties of initial-
value problems for a set of equations, such as the Nävier–Stokes equation or 
the Einstein field equations, already have available to them an explicit and 
purely formal system much like the Carnapian frameworks being 
recommended here. Since, the physical interpretation in the case of some fields 
                                                 
2
 In fact, I use this stance in my preliminary response to Maddy’s criticism of Carnap’s view of the 
ontological status of theoretical entities in §4.4. 
3
 I am grateful to Erik Curiel for making this suggestion. 
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is unclear, the formal framework is all that they have to ensure that they remain 
within the bounds of the theory.  
ii. In the presence of a well worked out and acceptable interpretation of a theory, 
such as General Relativity, physicists can use Carnapian frameworks to guide 
their search for novel and interesting results as well as to confirm the potential 
meaningfulness of results that have already been established.  
iii. In case a theoretical or experimental scientist wants to construct rigorous 
theoretical models of experiments or families of types of possible experiments, 
he/she will need more or less explicit Carnapian frameworks that contain clear 
physical interpretations of the theoretical terms invoked by the relevant theory.  
Such a possible extension of Carnapian frameworks for use by practicing scientists is a 
subject that I intend to pursue in subsequent research. As stated above, however, for the 
purpose of this dissertation, I will consider reconstruction as the proper setting for the 
deployment of Carnapian frameworks. 
 
3.2 Preliminary considerations, and two amendments to 
Carnap 
While I am sympathetic to Carnap’s reconstructive enterprise and agree with much of 
what he says in relation to it, there is an important way in which my approach here is a 
departure from his. Carnap advocated what has come to be known as a “syntactical view” 
of the representation of theories in his reconstruction, whereby these are to be expressed 
entirely in the language of logic. As Suppes (2002) points out, this narrow restriction on 
the form of expression of the theory makes its expression unduly laborious. Consider 
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Euclidean geometry. If we want to define a line, say, as a set of points, this requires that 
the concepts of set theory be readily expressible in the language of our framework, which 
is a decidedly painstaking task. The concern is amplified when we consider theories 
involving more complicated mathematical structures, such as general relativity or 
statistical mechanics, that would require the rendition in a logical language of quite 
complicated mathematics, such as results from spectral theory, symplectic theory, and so 
on. It is perhaps a testament to the complexity and the superfluity of the task of the 
linguistic reconstruction of theories that no substantive instance of the representation of a 
theory as a logical calculus seems to have been provided in the literature. 
Contrasted to the syntactic approach summarised above is the so-called “semantic 
view” of theories,4 which encourages the conception of a theory as a family of models 
rather than a set of sentences. A model is an abstract, non-linguistic entity (Suppes 2002, 
3) that occurs naturally in the context of a scientific theory. For instance, the 
measurement of the predicted consequences of a theory, given an experimental procedure 
and accordingly conducive datasets, involves a representation theorem that establishes an 
isomorphism between numerical models of the theory and the experimentally obtained 
datasets.5 This allows us to use familiar computational methods, which we know to be 
nicely applicable to the numerical model, to the experimentally determined sets of 
observations. Needless to say, such a task would be incredibly tedious in linguistic 
                                                 
4 See, for instance, van Fraassen (1980), Suppe (1989), and Suppes (2002) for different versions of this 
view. 
5 This is a bit quick and dirty. The datasets themselves are not the raw results of measurement. The 
measurements are typically subjected at least to data reduction and curve fitting. 
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representation. Hence, I will adopt this semantic view in the backdrop of Carnap’s 
account of theoretical entities in his reconstructive frameworks.  
Bas van Fraassen (1980, Ch. 3) embraces the semantic view in the course of a defence 
of his “Constructive Empiricism.” In addition to the variation in the nature and breadth of 
our respective concerns, my view here is different from his for two main reasons. First, in 
spite of his commitment to empiricism, van Fraassen’s reservations against Carnap’s 
project are quite thoroughgoing;6 on the contrary, I think it pertinent to label my approach 
Carnapian due to my subscription to the spirit of his project as well as much of its mature 
detail. Furthermore, in spite of his empiricist leanings, van Fraassen is fundamentally 
uninterested in a reconstructive project of the sort proposed by Carnap and favoured by 
me. 
It is also worthwhile to draw attention to the methodological approach that I adopt 
here, primarily to contrast it with strategies pursued in classic critiques of logical 
empiricism in general and Carnap in particular. These have tended to focus solely on 
general philosophical considerations (Quine 1951), objections relating to formalism,7 or 
arguments from common-sense analogies and toy examples (Suppe 1977), almost to the 
exclusion of an investigation of instances of the articulation and application of theories in 
science. This can be considered a “top-down” approach of sorts to the analysis and 
critique of philosophical theses regarding science. While there is nothing objectionable 
about this approach per se, its overemphasis in the course of the evaluation of proposals 
regarding approaches to scientific theories leads to analyses that are limited in their 
                                                 
6 For instance, he rejects the logical empiricist criterion of cognitive significance (1980, §2.7). 
7 Admittedly, this is shaped in large part by Carnap’s own focus in his programme. 
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vision and often erroneous as a consequence because they abstract from the details of 
these approaches. We will witness instances of these in my discussion of the criticisms of 
a Carnapian approach to theoretical entities in §3.4. 
In contrast, the methodology that I suggest through my critique of the accounts of 
mathematical explanation in Chapter 2 consists of a careful, “bottom-up” consideration of 
instances of the use of theory in representing target systems in the service of solutions to 
problems. The idea was to compare the general accounts of the explanatory role of 
mathematics in representation with practice in order to highlight their limitations. This 
approach has so far been fruitful in revealing how a consideration of the details of 
scientific theorising and practice may be critical to the success of a putative all-
encompassing account  of this kind. To this end, I analyse Maxwell’s system of equations 
of electromagnetism using the Carnapian framework that I propose. This helps illuminate 
the ways in which top-down criticisms of such frameworks are misguided because they 
ignore the detail afforded by a bottom-up approach, one that seeks to compare general 
theory with practice in order to make the former better informed and more reflective of 
the latter. It also helps exemplify the second, methodological, way in which my 
Carnapian proposal differs from Carnap’s original conception of frameworks. 
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3.3 Criticisms of theoretical entities in Carnap’s frameworks8 
In his recent book, Pincock (2012) investigates a variety of ways in which 
mathematics contributes to science. One of these is related to its role in the formulation of 
“constitutive representations.” While he does not provide a strict definition of the term, 
the general idea is that these constitute the general assumptions underlying other, derived 
representations that are specific to the physical system at hand.9 He provides the 
following definition of what he calls a “derivative representation”: “A representation r1 is 
derivative when its success depends on the success of another, constitutive representation 
r2” (2012, 121). Pincock concedes that the notion of a derivative (constitutive) 
representation posed by this definition is relative, in that a representation r1 can be 
constitutive with respect to another representation r2, but can also be derivative with 
regard to yet another representation, r3. 
Pincock employs the following general strategy to argue against Carnap’s account of 
theoretical entities: to show that the view regarding the meaning of scientific terms and 
propositions that appears to follow from his proposal is flawed. According to Pincock’s 
reading, rules of a framework for Carnap are ones for the proper use of signs that form 
the language of the framework in question, and exhaust its constitutive representations 
(2012, 124). The success of derivative representations is related to beliefs derived from 
the rules of the framework and/or other beliefs adopted on the basis of experience. The 
                                                 
8 The reader unfamiliar with Carnap might struggle with this section because my description of 
criticisms of his view inevitably involves, albeit minimally, the use of some vocabulary particular to his 
frameworks. This difficulty can be obviated by first reading §3.4, where I introduce the required apparatus 
to address these concerns. 
9 Strictly speaking, there is no requirement for a constitutive representation to represent a physical 
system. However, that is their purpose in the context of Pincock’s study and coheres well with his 
overarching aim: to provide an account of the contribution of mathematics to the success of science. 
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discussion of a “new domain” requires the introduction of new signs, according to 
Carnap. The use of these signs must be governed by rules along with their specification in 
order for them to be meaningful. These rules would include at least some specification of 
how existence questions within the framework can be resolved for the entities referred to 
by corresponding signs. Pincock sees Carnap as proposing the following test to evaluate 
the success of constitutive representations: Does adopting a framework contribute 
effectively to our stated goals (2012, 125)? If it does, the constitutive representation in 
question is accepted as justified. For instance, the fluid flow framework is founded on a 
set of rules that define the mathematical vocabulary employed. This allows the definition 
of further (physical) terms by reference to the logical and mathematical terms, which in 
turn make possible truth-functional claims involving mathematical and physical 
components related to the framework at hand. For instance, the Nävier–Stokes equations 
can then be formulated and determined to be true or false based on empirical testing. 
From this reconstruction of his view, Pincock observes that Carnap’s argument is 
grounded in two assumptions: “(1) the meaning of a new term is given by rules for its 
proper use, and (2) the rules will relate, at least in part, to how sentences using that term 
can be supported.” Pincock claims that both these assumptions are incorrect. Against (1), 
he invokes semantic externalism about the meaning of scientific terms, whereby the 
meaning of a term—including novel terms—invoked in science (and presumably 
referring to the system to be represented) is based on some kind of causal or other 
interaction between the agent and something in the world. Thus, Pincock argues, the 
meaning of a new term is not exhausted by the set of rules of its use outlined by the 
speaker, nor by the possible inferential rules that could be derived from such rules. 
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Consider the term “fluid.” On Carnap’s understanding, if two linguistic frameworks 
contain different rules for the use of the term “fluid,” the meaning of the term changes 
across the two frameworks. There seems to be something wrong about this, for we take 
the term “fluid” to refer to the same thing regardless of the successively sophisticated 
theories of fluids in the development of physics over the course of history. Furthermore, a 
framework can only be critically examined with regard to the objectives of the 
representation through pragmatic evaluation. There is no constant, framework-
independent subject matter on Carnap’s view that can be assumed in order to evaluate 
scientific progress (2012, 126). In a similar vein as Pincock, Glymour (1980, 61) 
attributes to Carnap the view that the rules of correspondence in his frameworks are 
stipulated, their truth is guaranteed by virtue of their meaning alone—they are analytic—
and they are never tested. Against this, he claims that not only are rules of 
correspondence subject to empirical verification, they are also susceptible to rejection or 
falsification. 
In his opposition to (2) above, Pincock claims that the rules for a framework need not 
be involved in specifying how derivative claims can be supported, but might simply 
reflect the features of the objects being referred to by the terms in question. That is to say 
that the mere specification of rules does not guarantee reference to any object, but that a 
new term must correspond to some feature of the world in order to refer. Pincock claims 
that Carnap would reject this link between rules and reference as traditional metaphysics, 
but that the latter’s own picture “makes meaning too easy to achieve and clashes with the 
way that mathematicians and scientists go about deciding when their words have 
successfully picked out something in the world” (2012, 126). 
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Another popular line of objection to Carnap’s mature view involves formal 
manipulation of his criterion of the cognitive significance of theoretical entities to show 
that it leads to unacceptable consequences. Versions of this objection have been posed by 
Rozeboom (1960) and Kaplan (1975), and have been endorsed by Glymour (1980) and 
Creath (1976).10 The criticism has been framed and argued in the context of Carnap’s 
logical definition of cognitive significance (1956) and involves a fair bit of formalism.11 I 
omit a formal statement of the criterion in question as well as the details of the formal 
manipulations involved in generating the objectionable consequences because this does 
not mitigate the force of the complaint; nor does my Carnapian response to it turn on the 
logical formalism used. Hence, a description of the objection in formal terms might, if 
anything, distract the reader from the issue that it seeks to bring to the fore.  
The idea is that in the context of Carnap’s frameworks, extending a theory by adding 
theoretical postulates or rules of coordination may cause some theoretical entities to lose 
significance (Rozeboom 1960, 37). Similarly, Kaplan (1975) claims that such an addition 
may cause hitherto insignificant theoretical entities to become meaningful. The former 
consequence is counter-intuitive because assuming that the additional rules or postulates 
are consistent with the existing content of the theory, this ought not to affect the 
significance of a theoretical term that draws its meaning from the original rules and 
postulates that remain part of the theory. The latter consequence is analogously untenable 
                                                 
10 Creath proposes a modification of the criterion of cognitive significance in defence of Carnap. 
11 The interested reader can find it in (Carnap 1956, 49). Roughly, a term of the theoretical vocabulary 
is said to be cognitively or empirically significant when a certain assumption involving the physical 
magnitude that it designates makes a difference in the prediction of an observable event. 
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because “definitional extensions”12 of the sort above are typically considered to add no 
empirical content to the original theory (Kaplan 1975, 90).13 It is germane to note that 
neither Kaplan nor Rozeboom provides a positive, alternative account of significance in 
the context of his criticism. The argumentative strategy employed by both seeks to reduce 
to absurdity Carnap’s formal criterion of significance for theoretical entities by showing 
that it yields the above consequences, which are intuitively unacceptable. It is further 
notable that neither Kaplan nor Rozeboom provides a formulation of even this intuitive 
notion in the course of his criticism. In all fairness, this is not needed for the success of 
the negative cases posed by them, so long as their readers acquiesce to the argument 
whereby the implications of Carnap’s criterion of significance ought not to follow from 
any cogent criterion of this kind, no matter what it might precisely be. 
From the above, we can identify five related reservations against Carnap’s account of 
theoretical entities in his frameworks. First, the meaning of a novel term introduced in a 
constitutive representation cannot be exhausted by the mere specification of general, 
theoretical rules because it leads to incommensurability in reference to, ostensibly, the 
same entity across different theoretical frameworks. Second, there is no framework-
independent method in Carnap’s conception that can be used to assess scientific 
progress.14 Third, a framework need not specify how propositions using a novel term can 
                                                 
12 If one were being a stickler for accuracy, one would point out that Carnap in fact does not think that 
theoretical entities in his framework can be defined. He thinks that they admit an indefinite number of 
“descriptions,” which may be thought of as rules of coordination, each of which provides a different 
method of measurement (1966, 234-236). 
13 Kaplan (1970, xlvi-xlvii) reports that in a meeting, Carnap agreed with his criticism and concluded 
that Hempel, Quine, and others were correct in claiming that theories must be accepted or rejected 
wholesale. 
14 This objection is implicitly addressed in Chapter 4. 
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be verified, but may simply reflect the features of the object designated by a term. Fourth, 
the addition of theoretical postulates or rules of correspondence to a framework can cause 
theoretical entities to gain or lose meaning, which is intuitively unacceptable given our 
knowledge of scientific theories. Lastly, Carnap’s view of frameworks is simplistic, and 
thus does not accurately reflect scientific practice. 
The last of these criticisms can be considered to be the crux of the reservations against 
Carnap’s proposal, since each of the other four, when articulated at length, ultimately 
relies on the dissonance between Carnap’s account of representational systems and the 
manner in which scientists actually reason about such systems. 
 
3.4 Carnap on theoretical terms 
Carnap’s mature reflections on the status and function of theoretical terms in his 
linguistic frameworks can be found in “The methodological character of theoretical 
concepts” (1956, 38-75). For these frameworks, the language of science is divided into a 
theoretical and an observational part. The theoretical language LT consists of logical and 
descriptive constants, the latter of which form the theoretical vocabulary VT of the 
language (1956, 42). A theory according to Carnap consists of a finite number of 
postulates T in LT, where these postulates correspond to axioms or constitutive 
representations on Pincock’s conception. The theoretical language and the observational 
language LO are connected through rules of correspondence, or C-rules (1956, 39), which 
only provide a partial, indirect interpretation of the theoretical terms of VT. This means 
that only some terms of the theoretical vocabulary are directly connected to observational 
terms through the correspondence rules, and the remaining theoretical terms are 
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connected to the theoretical terms mentioned first through the postulates of LT, and are 
hence indirectly connected to the observational language. 
It is important to note that according to Carnap, LT, consisting of postulates T and the 
rules of deduction of the chosen logical system, is an uninterpreted calculus prior to the 
specification of the C-rules in the language (1956, 46). All interpretation that can be 
accorded to LT is by virtue of its relation with the observational language LO through the 
rules of correspondence. These rules permit the derivation of certain sentences of LO from 
those of LT, or vice versa.
15
 The C-rules indirectly derive conclusions in LO, such as the 
prediction of observable events. Thus, without the rules of correspondence, terms of VT 
would have no observational significance (1956, 47). 
An instance of the use of C-rules in the framework is to connect a location in physical 
space with corresponding space-time coordinates x, y, z, t. The C-rule R, say, relates to an 
observable space-time region, say u, through a class of coordinate quadruples of intervals 
about (x, y, z, t). Theoretical quantities such as mass, length, volume, velocity, etc., are 
assigned interpretations after a similar fashion.16 
A more involved example of a C-rule is the definition of “kinetic energy” for 
Newtonian particles: “measure the inertial mass of the particle; measure the velocity of 
the particle; its kinetic energy is one-half times the mass times the square of the velocity; 
it follows that the concept of kinetic energy requires the fixation of a frame of reference 
                                                 
15 In this formulation, Carnap hints at the dialectic between theory and experimentation, the neglect of 
which by large parts of the contemporary philosophical community has led to inaccurate criticisms of 
Carnap. I discuss this in §3.6. 
16 Even though general, this is admittedly too simplistic an account of how theoretical entities are 
related to phenomena and hence rendered significant. See my remarks in §3.7 for a brief discussion of how 
the Carnapian programme can be extended to provide detail here. 
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for the representation of its value, insofar as velocity itself is not defined outside the 
context of a fixed frame of reference.”17 Note that in this instance, kinetic energy is a 
theoretical term defined using other theoretical terms—inertial mass and velocity—that 
are in turn defined through C-rules.18 
In light of the above, Carnap thinks that a criterion of significance or meaningfulness 
for LT should constitute exact conditions that terms and sentences of the theoretical 
language must fulfil in order to play a positive role in the explanation and prediction of 
observable events and, thus, to be accepted as empirically meaningful (1956, 38).19 He 
articulates the following criterion: a term of VT is said to be cognitively or empirically 
significant if, when a certain assumption involving a physical magnitude m is specified 
by theoretical term M, a certain assumption involving m makes a difference in the 
prediction of an observable event. Specifically, there is a sentence SM of T, regarding the 
term M, such that it can be used to infer SO in LO (1956, 49). 
As one might imagine, the notion of “real” in LT, pertaining to theoretical entities, 
differs from the manner in which it is used in LO.
20 To say, for instance, that a magnetic 
field is real is to agree to understand the acceptance of the reality of the electromagnetic 
field in the classical sense as the acceptance of LT and a term E in it, as well as a set of 
postulates T, which includes the laws of classical electromagnetism (Maxwell’s 
                                                 
17 I am indebted to Erik Curiel for providing this example in personal correspondence. 
18 Strictly speaking, only inertial mass is defined directly through a C-rule that connects it with physical 
observation. Velocity is defined by a C-rule in terms of displacement and time, and displacement in turn is 
expressed by yet another C-rule that links it to empirical observation, on this account. 
19 Note that this consideration is contra Pincock’s contention that the Carnapian theoretical language—
or, equivalently, constitutive representations—is adjudicated solely on the basis of pragmatic aspects. 
20 In LO, the statement that an event is “real” means that the sentence of LO describing it is true (e.g., 
“This valley has a lake.”). 
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equations), as postulates for E (1956, 45). Then, for an observer to “accept” the postulates 
of T means not simply to admit T as an uninterpreted calculus, but to use T along with a 
specified set of C-rules to guide his/her expectations by deriving predictions regarding 
future observable events from observed events, based on the postulates T and the C-rules. 
Carnap encourages us to think of the postulates T as representing the fundamental laws of 
physics, but not other statements, however well established they may be (1956, 48). 
Furthermore, both T and the C-rules are completely general, e.g., they do not contain any 
references to particular positions in space-time, etc. 
Interestingly, Carnap offers a response to Pincock’s concern that his framework 
renders the meaning of novel theoretical terms too easy to obtain. He claims that a new 
theoretical term is introduced to VT only when a “radical revolution” is effected in the 
system of science, and not otherwise (1956, 50-1). This is because the postulates T, and 
the class of terms of LT admitted as significant, contain only fundamental scientific laws, 
which are not altered whenever new facts are discovered. Furthermore, as Carnap 
emphasises, even though all of T is presupposed in the criterion of significance, the issue 
of meaningfulness is separately considered for each theoretical term, and not merely for 
VT as a whole. As we shall now see, when we consider Maxwell’s formulation of his 
equations of electromagnetism, it was precisely a radical revolution in our conception of 
the nature of electromagnetism that was brought about by the introduction of a novel term 
in the theoretical language. 
 
3.5 Maxwell and the displacement current 
From a long view of the history of mankind—seen from, say, ten thousand years from now—there 
can be little doubt that the most significant event of the 19th century will be judged as Maxwell’s 
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discovery of the laws of electrodynamics. The American Civil War will pale into provincial 
insignificance in comparison with this important scientific event of the same decade. 
(Feynman 1964, vol. 2, 1-6) 
 
Maxwell’s discovery of the laws of electromagnetism is one of the most significant 
events in the history of scientific thought. He first derived them in his “On physical lines 
of force” (1862) as 20 differential equations of 20 variables. He was also the first to show 
that these laws are expressible as first-order partial differential equations (Fitzpatrick 
2008, 116).  
Michael Faraday had previously revolutionised physics in 1830 by showing through 
extensive experimentation that electricity and magnetism are interrelated.21 Maxwell was 
the first to clarify and articulate the nature of this relationship between the two 
phenomena, in the form of equations that are as remarkable for their elegance as they are 
for their immense range of applicability. In modern notation, these four equations are as 
follows: 
 
∇  . E = ρ/ε0    (3.1) 
∇  . B = 0    (3.2) 
∇  × E = −∂B/∂t   (3.3) 
∇  × B = μ0 j + ε0μ0 ∂E/∂t  (3.4) 
where E represents the electric field, B is the magnetic field, ρ is the charge density, j 
is the current density, ε0 is the permittivity of free space, and μ0 is its permeability. 
                                                 
21 Maxwell, who was heavily influenced by Faraday’s experimental work, subscribed to his “lines of 
force” model (Faraday 1852) to explain electric and magnetic forces, contra the action-at-a-distance theory 
of forces held by the majority of physicists at the time, such as Weber (Weber and Kohlrausch, 1856). 
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As we can see, Eqs. (3.1) and (3.3) are correspondent, as are Eqs. (3.2) and (3.4). 
Equation (3.1) states that the divergence of the electric field E is charge density/ε0, which 
is true of static as well as dynamic fields. Equation (3.2) says that since there are no 
magnetic charges, the flux of the magnetic field B through any closed surface is always 
zero (Feynman 1964, vol. 2, 18-1). Equation (3.3) describes the induction of electric 
fields by changing magnetic fields, and Eq. (3.4) describes the generation of magnetic 
fields by electric current as well as the induction of magnetic fields by changing electric 
fields over time (Fitzpatrick 2008, 122). 
Prior to Maxwell’s work, the magnetic field of steady currents was expressed as 
∇  × B = j / ε0c2    (3.5) 
which is Ampere’s original circuital law. A divergence of the above equation reduces 
the left-hand side to zero because the divergence of a curl is always zero. Hence, the 
divergence of j ought also to be zero. But if so, the net flux of current out of any closed 
surface is zero as well (Feynman 1964, vol. 2, 18-1). This cannot be true in general 
because we know that charges can move from one place to another. Hence the 
introduction by Maxwell of the extra term to yield Eq. (3.4). 
Feynman provides a simple example to explain where Ampere’s original law 
encounters difficulties (1964, vol. 2, 18-2). Imagine a large symmetrical, spherical block 
of Jello that is a conductor with a hole in the centre, into which some charge has been 
injected through a hypodermic needle, and is slowly leaking. We assume that the current 
is moving radially outward, with the same magnitude in all directions. The question, then, 
is whether the current generates a magnetic field. It does not. This is because since the 
sphere is symmetric, it can only generate a symmetric magnetic field. However, the only 
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fields possible in this case are one that points everywhere outwards and one directed 
everywhere inwards, both of which correspond to non-existent monopoles by Eq. (3.2) 
above. Hence, Ampere’s law must be wrong because we know that a magnetic field 
always exists around a charge. 
The most commonly used instance to clarify this problem and underscore Maxwell’s 
contribution involves a parallel plate capacitor (Fitzpatrick 2008, 118). I will use it to 
clarify why Maxwell needed the additional term that distinguishes Eq. (3.4) from Eq. 
(3.5) above. 
Consider a long, straight wire interrupted by a parallel plate capacitor, as shown in 
Fig. 3.1. The letter “C” in the figure represents a loop circling the wire. In time-
dependent situations, transient current flows through the wire as the capacitor charges up 
or down, generating a transient magnetic field. Hence, the line integral of the magnetic 
field B around C is non-zero. According to Ampere’s circuital law, the flux of current 
density through any surface attached to C should be non-zero as well. 
 
Figure 3.1. The application of Ampere's circuital law to a charging/discharging capacitor (from 
Fitzpatrick (2008, 118)). 
Now consider two such surfaces, S1 and S2. S1 intersects the wire; hence, the flux of j 
through the surface is non-zero because it intersects a current-carrying wire. S2 passes 
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between the two capacitors, as shown in the above figure, and does not intersect the wire. 
Hence, the flux of current density j through S2 is zero. However, since both surfaces are 
attached to the same loop C, Ampere’s law 
 
requires that the two fluxes be identical. Ampere’s law is thus incorrect in this context. 
Note, however, that while S2 does not intersect the electric current (loop C), it does 
pass through a region of strong changing electric field as it threads between the plates of 
the capacitor. Hence, Maxwell altered Ampere’s law to 
 
or 
∇  × B = μ0 j +  m0μ0 ∂E / ∂t 
by adding the new second term—m0μ0 ∂E / ∂t—describing the induction of magnetic 
fields by changing electric fields. This was called “displacement current density” by 
Maxwell.22 
 
3.6 Reconsidering criticisms of Carnapian frameworks 
Equations (3.1)-(3.4) are clearly fundamental laws, and hence would correspond to T-
postulates for Carnap and, equivalently, constitutive representations for Pincock. In fact, 
                                                 
22 As is well known, the term “displacement current” is a misnomer because it is not current at all, but 
the induction of magnetic fields by time-dependent electric fields. Maxwell subscribed to the existence of 
the aether, which was thought to permeate all space. He called the phenomenon “displacement current” 
under the assumption that it was caused by displacement in the aether. Maxwell considered electric and 
magnetic fields to be manifestations of stress in the aether. 
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as Feynman states, in the context of 19th century physics, Maxwell’s equations in 
conjunction with the others shown in Figure 3.2 below, constituted all known 
fundamental classical physics (excluding thermodynamics) until 1905 (1964, vol. 2, 18-
3). The C-rules, though not specified, are presumably constituted by general guidelines 
for the association of theoretical terms, such as charge, flux, electric and magnetic 
intensities, etc., with physical magnitudes and spatial coordinates in order to provide an 
interpretation of these in the observational language. The ability to measure the 
magnitudes of these theoretical terms of the system also determines the criterion of 
significance specific to each. 
The new term in Eq. (3.4), ϵ0μ0 ∂E / ∂t, signifies the displacement current. Hence, we 
see that the new term representing the induction of magnetic fields due to changing 
electric fields is defined in terms of other theoretical terms of the system— ϵ,0, μ0, and 
∂E/∂t—the values of which can be determined through the relevant C-rules. 
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Thus, the displacement current is defined, and hence assigned a definite meaning, in 
terms of these theoretical terms, and the definition immediately provides a method to 
measure it by virtue of the correspondence rules used to determine the values of t0, μ0, and 
∂E/∂t. 
As we saw in §3.3, Pincock attributes to Carnap the view that the meaning of a 
theoretical term is exhausted by the rules for its use, and objects to it on the ground that a 
theoretical term in physics needs to somehow be linked to phenomena in any framework 
that purports to successfully describe theories in physics, which predict affairs in the 
world with remarkable success. However, this attribution is incorrect. Carnap in fact 
claims that a “theoretical term can never be explicitly defined on the basis of observable 
Figure 3.2. All of classical physics (from Feynman (1964, vol. 2, 18-1)). 
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terms” (1966, 234). And he justifies this claim by appealing to the history of science. The 
rules of correspondence in Carnapian frameworks should roughly be understood as 
procedures for the measurement of the magnitudes of the theoretical quantities with 
which they are associated. They are intended to supply the elusive connection between 
theory and observation by partially interpreting the theoretical terms in a manner that 
corresponds to a certain observation. In order to understand why the interpretation should 
be partial, Carnap invites us to consider the theoretical term “temperature” in the kinetic 
theory of molecules (1966, 265-266). There are rules of correspondence that link this 
term with the construction and use of a thermometer. The thermometer, when suspended 
in a liquid, records a measurement that the correspondence rules associate with 
“temperature” in a way that provides an interpretation of the term. This interpretation is 
partial because it does not apply to all sentences of the theory featuring the theoretical 
term “temperature:” an ordinary thermometer can only measure temperature in a limited 
interval (e.g., the mercury-in-glass thermometer covers a range from -37 °C (-34.6 ºF) to 
356 °C (672.8 ºF)). For temperatures below which any test liquid would freeze and those 
above which any test liquid would solidify, special measurement techniques are used; 
these in turn require different C-rules from the ones that govern the measurement of 
“temperature” with a mercury-in-glass thermometer. Even if an alcohol thermometer is 
used to measure temperature in a range that overlaps with that measureable by a mercury-
in-glass thermometer, different correspondence rules would be required for the former 
than those used for the latter, at least because a different fluid with different properties is 
involved. Now each of these C-rules provides a different interpretation of “temperature,” 
but none of these by itself can be said to exhaust the meaning of the term. 
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Carnap explicitly invokes the practice of science in defence of his resistance to 
(exhaustive) definitions of theoretical terms in physics. He hints at an instance—the 
extension of Maxwell’s equations of electromagnetism, in fact—in a different context 
(1966, 242), but I think it applies nicely here. There was a parameter “c”23 in Maxwell’s 
equations that described the velocity of waves in an electromagnetic field in case of a 
disturbance. Coupled with the theoretical observation that the electromagnetic field in 
free space following the elimination of either the electric or the magnetic field from his 
equations was describable by the wave equation of classical optics, Maxwell conjectured 
that light is a special case of electromagnetic oscillation. This was borne out following 
the brilliant experiments by Hertz in 1888 (Goldstein 2010, 575). Here is an example 
where a theoretical term, c, that was assigned one interpretation was accorded another in 
a move that led to a massive advancement in physics. And this is not an isolated instance, 
as Carnap points out (1966, 237). The history of 19th century physics is peppered with 
instances where additions to the interpretations of theoretical terms have yielded 
revolutionary insights.  
I make much ado of this because it is not about nothing. It reveals another benefit of 
Carnapian frameworks as it concerns their harmony with scientific theorising and 
practice. With regard to the reconstruction of theories, the Carnapian refusal to explicitly 
define theoretical terms nicely reflects the tenor of the historical development of 
scientific theories, as we have seen above.24 
                                                 
23 In Eq. (3.4), c = 1 / ϵ0μ0. 
24 Furthermore, if I may be allowed to speak loosely, with regard to prediction, it offers a clear, albeit 
very general, possibility of the contribution that a Carnapian reconstruction might make to theories in 
science that are current. Given that our (theoretical) knowledge in physics seems to be tending towards a 
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The above tangent notwithstanding, charity demands that I consider Pincock’s 
criticism above by applying it to the partial interpretation of theoretical entities. That is, 
if, as I gathered from my consideration of his remarks in §3.3, the crux of Pincock’s 
criticisms of Carnapian frameworks is that they do not accurately track scientific 
progress, his objections ought then to be considered in light of a modified criticism. This 
would be as follows: Carnap claims that all the interpretation that can be accorded to a 
theoretical term is due to rules for its use (its rules of correspondence). Since Carnapian 
frameworks are presumably intended to reconstruct scientific theories, which describe 
and predict events in the world, some link is required between the interpretation of 
theoretical terms and the phenomena that they are supposed to represent. But theoretical 
terms are analytically defined, which forestalls the possibility of empirical content. 
Hence, Carnapian frameworks fail to fulfil their purpose. 
It is true that in a Carnapian framework, the partial interpretation of a new theoretical 
term is determined by the postulates in conjunction with the C-rules. However, as the 
historical example in §3.5 has shown, this is nothing other than the assignment of 
interpretation to theoretical terms through the delineation of rules for the measurement of 
quantities associated with the corresponding observable terms. This is accepted, common 
practice in science. Pincock’s argument appears to be premised on the conception of an 
armchair theoretician who has little regard for whether representational systems, or the 
terms employed in the postulates constituting these, actually represent phenomena. The 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
convergence, exemplified in the spectre of the Grand Unified Theory model, a Carnapian reconstruction 
can help identify possible connections between theoretical terms representing seemingly disparate 
phenomena in different contexts. This would enable it to assist scientists by anticipating these relationships. 
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criticism that Carnap’s view “makes meaning too easy to attain” is a consequence of this 
assumption, and one of the commonest misunderstandings of the nature of Carnap’s 
frameworks. One can easily devise a completely arbitrary framework, containing the 
minimally required postulates, C-rules, etc., such that all theoretical terms can be 
assigned meaning. However, the criticism is misplaced because while such a toy 
framework would never be judged to be fruitful or desirable by a reasonable scientist, 
Carnap is not at all concerned with frameworks of this nature, based on little more than a 
priori whimsy. The generation and appropriate articulation of a theoretical Carnapian 
framework that can be useful to scientific modelling and inquiry, such as that provided by 
Maxwell, is an extremely complex exercise. Furthermore, even though Maxwell was not 
an experimentalist, he had access to mountains of experimental data, based on work by 
Faraday, Coulomb, Ampere, and others, that profoundly shaped and informed his 
research. In fact, Maxwell’s discovery of the inadequacy of Ampere’s circuital law, 
through the experiment involving a parallel plate capacitor, is based on intimate 
knowledge of the experimental procedures in electricity and magnetism at the time. Large 
parts of his corpus, in particular A Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism (1873), are 
devoted to establishing the adequacy of his proposed equations for various experimental 
situations.25 Hence, it is incorrect to assume that Carnapian frameworks are to be used by 
theoreticians without regard for experimental research in their respective areas. 
Maxwell’s addition to Ampere’s Law in the above also serves to address the concerns 
expressed by Rozeboom and Kaplan, and endorsed by Glymour. The objection was that 
                                                 
25 Item: Part III of Ch. VII of the 1873 treatise is entitled “Magnetic measurements,” Ch. XV is called 
“Electromagnetic instruments,” XVII is titled “Electricity measure of the coefficient of induction,” and so 
on. 
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the addition of theoretical postulates or rules of coordination, provided these are 
consistent with pre-existing content of a given theory, should not cause theoretical 
entities that were already part of the framework to gain or lose significance because this 
militates against our intuitions and is contrary to scientific practice. As we saw, Maxwell 
added the term for the displacement current—ϵ0μ0 ∂E / ∂t—to Ampere’s circuital law—∇  
× B = j / ε0c2. Note that Maxwell’s addition is consistent with Ampere’s law, and does 
not render it false: as we now know, the circuital law is known to hold in magnetostatic 
situations—systems where the electric current is steady—and Maxwell’s addition is 
required in all other cases. Hence, this is a case of addition to the set of postulates of a 
theory. Moreover, it certainly alters the significance of the theoretical term associated 
with the flux in the magnetic field by rendering it dependent on displacement current in 
addition to current density. This falsifies the assumption, based on mere intuition, 
underlying Rozeboom and Kaplan’s criticisms, whereby theoretical terms must retain 
their significance in case the theory is extended. Relatedly, insofar as the addition of the 
rules of coordination constitutes an extension to the theory in a Carnapian framework as 
well as in scientific practice, and since these rules would typically be exemplified in a 
Carnapian framework as a wide variety of models of measurement procedures, 
representation theorems, data collection procedures, data normalisation procedures, etc., 
there is no reason based on scientific theorising and practice to think that the significance 
of a theoretical entity is somehow independent of extensions to the theory. 
Furthermore, given the criterion of significance for theoretical entities provided by 
Carnap, it is clear that the framework contains an internal yardstick by which to gauge 
the success of the employment of a theoretical term, or a postulate, which can then be 
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revised if the criterion is not satisfied, i.e., if a change in the value of the relevant 
theoretical term does not yield a difference in the observation or prediction of the relevant 
events. Analogously, a theoretical framework as a whole is assessed according to its 
success in representing the phenomena in question. 
 
3.7 Limitations, and another amendment to Carnap 
It is apt to conclude this chapter by highlighting the limitations of my argument in 
defence of Carnapian frameworks. I have shown that the criticisms against the fitness of 
these frameworks to represent scientific theories described in §3.3 dissipate when we 
analyse instances from science. At the same time, it should be clear that my analysis of 
Maxwell’s equations of electromagnetism in the context of Carnapian frameworks goes 
only into sufficient detail to address such a priori concerns. The detailed reconstruction of 
Maxwell’s theory along the lines of a Carnapian framework, even assuming a semantic or 
model-theoretic view, is an extremely complex and challenging task, and one that is 
better left for a more ambitious enterprise in more capable hands.26 
 Furthermore, the instance of the sort that I have analysed in §3.5, strictly speaking, 
proves nothing conclusive regarding the soundness of Carnapian frameworks for 
representing scientific theories in general; nor does it decidedly refute all the objections 
to Carnap presented in §3.3. At the same time, it should cast significant doubt on the 
correctness of these and other a priori criticisms of Carnapian frameworks. 
                                                 
26 Prof. DiSalle has pointed out to me that such a detailed reconstruction may not always be required, as 
it is possible that the relevant philosophical issues are addressed by the sort of sketch I have provided here. 
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In spite of the above, it is understandable to view the above reservations against 
Carnap’s frameworks as prompted and encouraged in part by the absence of important 
details in his elaboration of his programme for the reconstruction of scientific theories. I 
refer to his unsatisfactory description of the manner in which the rules of correspondence 
provide (partial) interpretations of theoretical terms. Consider the example cited in §3.4 
of the how the C-rules are used: “the C-rule R, say, relates to an observable space-time 
region, say u, through a class of coordinate quadruples of intervals about (x, y, z, t).” We 
know that the assignment of physical magnitudes to theoretical entities is certainly not as 
simple a task as suggested by this. Underlying such an assignment is a series of complex 
processes that mediate the connection between theoretical entities and observational 
reports. Carnap might claim that this simplification is justified given that he intends to 
provide a framework that is applicable to the practice of science in general, rather than a 
particular formulation that can provide the requisite detail for some branches thereof but 
might prove too restrictive for others. However, the issue is precisely that the process of 
coordinating theoretical constructs with experimental data is in general a very 
complicated exercise. The reconstructive project of the kind that Carnap proposes thus 
requires a more detailed, albeit schematic,27 account of the various steps involved in 
arriving at an epistemological rapprochement between theory and observation. As Quine 
points out in a different context, 
I think [Carnap’s example of locational coordination, as above,] is a good schematization (deliberately 
oversimplified, to be sure) of what science really does; but it provides no indication, not even the 
                                                 
27 I am using schematic in the sense described by Stein (1994). Speaking in a similar context regarding a 
possible way of circumventing the intractable problem of deducing observations from a Carnapian 
framework, he proposes mathematical structures within the theory that can represent generic experimental 
procedures and empirical content. 
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sketchiest, of how a statement of the form ‘Quality q is at x; y; z; t’ could ever be translated into Carnap's 
initial language of sense data and logic. 
(Quine 1951, 37-38) 
 
Among other things, a more representative account of the connection between theory 
and observation would take cognisance of the fact that this correspondence is obtained 
through a series of procedures involving, on the one hand, the development of a tractable 
numerical model of the theory that is susceptible to testing and, on the other, the 
manipulation of the results of experimental procedures to obtain datasets in a form that 
fits with the models of the theory. All this does not even take into account considerations 
of the theory involved in the design of experiments and the interpretations of the results 
of these in order to render them in a form conducive to models of the theory.28 At the 
same time, Carnap’s frameworks are readily susceptible to the provision and addition of 
this detail because they are designed in light of canonical physical theories.29 The sort of 
model-theoretic, semantic approach to theories that I outlined in §3.2 is well suited to 
this, and can help provide this structure. 
Hence, this is a third way in which my proposal here deviates from Carnap’s original 
programme—the other two being a semantic view of theories rather than Carnap’s 
syntactic view, and a detail-oriented, bottom-up approach to instances of the use of 
theory. Nonetheless, this departure can help provide the sort of detail that, on the one 
hand, will help make such frameworks more representative of the details of scientific 
practice and, on the other, will forestall objections that do not engage scientific practice 
                                                 
28 It is this complexity that leads Stein (1992, 1994) to think that a deductive “dictionary” of 
correspondence rules linking theory to observation is not forthcoming. 
29 Curiel (2005, 2012) has undertaken some promising work in this area. 
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by presenting the problems of the relation between theory and observation as detail-
oriented puzzles that inevitably require such engagement. 
I have argued in this chapter that Carnapian frameworks are adequate for the 
representation of theoretical entities as they are employed in our scientific theories. In the 
context of the philosophy of science, this helps partly address one of two related, general 
considerations. The first involves issues relating to the adequacy of the 
theoretical/mathematical apparatus used in a theory to represent phenomena, its role in 
the design and methodology of experiments that can confirm or infirm its hypotheses, the 
accuracy with which a theory so formulated can predict features of the target system, and 
so on. While my proposal and defence here has been limited to a Carnapian conception of 
theoretical entities in philosophical reconstructions of scientific theories, a complete 
linguistic framework of this sort should help provide insights into conceptualising and 
examining the above matters. Such a complete account is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. The second consideration related to the use of theoretical entities in 
scientific representation pertains to the justification for the use of mathematics in 
scientific theories, and is couched in questions regarding the ontological status of the 
formalism used in representational systems. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the use of 
abstract and highly complex mathematics allows us to model and predict goings on in the 
physical world with remarkable accuracy, and this nourishes the idea that mathematics is 
somehow “real” in the way the things it (oftentimes) describes are real. This leads to 
demands by many to ground our mathematical knowledge on a firm epistemological 
footing such that its ready application to the representation of phenomena is vindicated. 
Hence, in the next chapter, I attempt to address inquiries concerning the ontological 
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status of theoretical entities in science by answering the third of the research questions 
posed for this dissertation in §1.1: What can we conclude about the nature of 
theoretical/mathematical entities employed in a theory from its success in representing 
phenomena? More generally, what philosophical benefit, if any, is to be expected from 
ontological inquiries of the above sort, and how ought it to shape our preferences 
concerning research questions in the discipline? 
  85 
4 The status of mathematical entities in science 
Les métaphysiciens sont des musiciens sans dons musicaux. 
Rudolf Carnap 
 
The ontological status of abstract entities has long been a controversial subject in 
philosophy. In the literature on the philosophies of science and mathematics in the last 
few decades, the recognition of the mathematisation of science has prompted renewed 
demands for efforts to justify the use of mathematics in representation. We employ our 
scientific theories to gain knowledge of the world, the structures and features of the 
phenomena therein, and to predict the course of events based on the representations of the 
world facilitated by mathematics. Hence, the argument goes, in order to be certain that 
our knowledge of the world is well grounded, the mathematics employed in our scientific 
theories needs to be justified. 
While demands for the justification of the mathematics used in science have been 
variously articulated by different thinkers, a shared feature of these is the emphasis on 
doing so by establishing some kind of a connection between knowledge that is already 
relatively securely grounded, such as empirical evidence based on sense experience, and 
abstract mathematical formalism. Hence, Benacerraf thinks that to this end, any theory 
that interprets mathematical truth as “theoremhood” also needs to explicate the 
connection between truth and theoremhood (1973, 666). This would be tantamount to 
having obtained “mathematical objectivity” of the sort desired (Putnam 1979a). 
According to Maddy, it was this desire for a firm grounding for mathematics, and hence 
for all our scientific knowledge, that drew Gödel to commit to realism regarding 
mathematics. Kfia (1993, 19) even claims that the examination of the ontological status 
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of mathematical entities has “far-reaching implications” for the method of science in 
general, and for physics in particular. In a spirit similar to that of Benacerraf’s inquiry, 
Pincock regards as a most pressing issue the justification of the “purely mathematical 
beliefs” involved in the theoretical frameworks of our representational systems (2012, 
139). Mathematical claims have truth conditions; hence, in order to know these claims, 
we must possess evidence that these truth conditions have been satisfied. Merely deriving 
a claim from axioms is thus insufficient to generate knowledge because one has yet to 
establish a connection with truth in such cases. These appeals to ground the mathematics 
used in our scientific theories seem to be based on a commitment to some variety of 
semantic externalism, whereby one needs a connection, in this context, between a formal 
claim and events in the world. 
In this chapter, in response to the final research question for this dissertation stated in 
§1.1—What can we conclude about the nature of theoretical/mathematical entities 
employed in a theory from its success in representing phenomena? More generally, how 
should the philosophical benefit, if any, to be expected from ontological inquiries of this 
sort shape our preferences concerning research questions in philosophy?—I consider 
two major responses to the above concern regarding the status of the theoretical 
components of scientific representation, offered by Quine and Carnap. I consider these 
two thinkers because not only have they been among the most influential figures in the 
philosophy of science in the last few decades, the general position that each espouses is 
also representative of a major side in the debate on the status of theoretical entities. In 
very rough terms, Quine represents the so-called “naturalist” position, which denies any 
distinction between the analytic and synthetic parts of our knowledge, and hence looks to 
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science for its ontological commitments. Carnap likewise represents a “neutralist”52 
stance that seeks to offer a deflationary response to the question of the existence of 
theoretical entities, including the mathematics used in our theories. Furthermore, while 
philosophers sympathetic to the views of Carnap and Quine have critiqued and further 
developed their respective positions on the above issue, they have remained faithful to the 
fundamental claims that shape their general positions. Hence, for instance, while 
Maddy’s Second Philosopher (2008, 87) proposes “friendly amendments” to the Quinean 
programme,53 these amendments do not result in a significant or principled modification 
in her stance on the status of theoretical entities. Any deviations from Quine’s views are 
either not pertinent to the issue at hand, or are sufficiently small in the context of the 
generality of the discussion to be neglected as internal disputes.54 I mention Maddy as the 
most influential representative of a Quinean position on the issue, but the same general 
commitments regarding the status of theoretical entities are shared by Colyvan (2001), 
Baker (2005), Resnik (1995), and many others. Similar considerations apply to 
contemporary philosophers sympathetic to Carnap’s enterprise, such as Friedman (2001) 
and Stein (1989, 1992), although these are far fewer in number than those seduced by 
Quine. A notable exception is William Demopoulos (2012), whose deviation from 
Carnap in the context of the status of theoretical entities is discussed in detail in §4.4. 
                                                 
52 This term is due to Psillos (1999, Ch. 3). I, for one, consider his stance rather militant. 
53 For instance, “[Contra Quine,] the Second Philosopher resists the characterization of her 
commonsense beliefs about ordinary physical objects as inferred from some sensory ‘data’; it now emerges 
that she also departs from Quine’s naturalistic analysis of higher scientific theorizing.” 
54 For instance, Maddy (1992, 280) disagrees with Quine about the ontological status of higher 
mathematics. 
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Section 4.1 is devoted to a description of Quine’s attitude to the challenge of the 
ontological status of theoretical entities in general, including mathematics, in our 
scientific theories. As we shall see, he embraces the proclaimed need to ground our 
mathematical knowledge and proposes a conception whereby the entirety of our 
knowledge—and, a fortiori, all our scientific theories—is subject to empirical 
verification, without countenancing a distinction in kind between theoretical (including 
mathematical and logical) statements and empirical claims. Section 4.2 contains the 
details of Carnap’s deflationary response. He convincingly argues that questions 
concerning the status of mathematical entities are misguided at best and meaningless at 
worst. I showed in Chapter 3 that Carnapian frameworks are conducive to the articulation 
of scientific theories, and can handle theoretical mathematical entities in a manner that 
tracks scientific practice. In §4.3, I argue that Carnap’s approach to questions of the 
ontology of mathematics, grounded firmly in and flowing naturally from his conception 
of frameworks, offers far more promise for philosophical investigation than the Quinean 
alternative. I do this by showing how commitment to a Quinean view of theoretical 
entities in science has spawned the Indispensability Argument debate in the philosophy of 
mathematics, which appears misguided and seems to offer little by way of 
methodological and epistemic insights. While I highlight the assumptions driving the 
debate in order to relate these to Quine, I will eschew a consideration of these in any 
detail. This is largely because engaging such debates is tantamount to contributing to 
futile inquiries in philosophy.55 Instead, I make a novel, pragmatic argument for why 
                                                 
55 However, see, Field (1980), Maddy (1992), Leng (2005), and Bangu (2008) for objections to various 
premises of the argument. 
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Carnap’s approach to the status of theoretical/mathematical entities is a more appropriate 
attitude for meaningful progress in the philosophy of science. Section 4.4 is devoted to a 
recent criticism of Carnap’s position by Maddy and a critique by Demopoulos in the 
context of experimental proof for the discovery of the atom. A concern shared by both is 
that Carnap’s distinction between internal and external questions in the context of 
theoretical entities tends to misrepresent and undermine instances of genuine scientific 
discovery. The outcome of my consideration is that the atomic hypothesis and similar 
instances pose no problem for Carnap’s view, and hence that no refinement of his 
position on the issue is needed. Note that this is at variance with the Carnapian stance 
that I assumed in Chapter 3, which involved a modification to Carnap’s reconstructive 
project. 
A reminder of my usage is in order. As the reader might notice, I will interchangeably 
use the terms “mathematical entities” and “theoretical entities.” Unless otherwise 
specified, they should be taken to be identical, insofar as the mathematical apparatus is a 
subset of the machinery required for a theory. Furthermore, theoretical entities in science 
in general, and in physics in particular, are described in mathematical vocabulary. The 
above identification will become particularly stark in §4.4, when I consider the atomic 
hypothesis. However, this is not a problem because in the context of his views on the 
ontological status of theoretical entities, neither Quine nor Carnap makes a distinction 
between mathematical terms and other theoretical terms. This is not to claim that there is 
no difference at all for Carnap between purely formal systems, such as Peano Arithmetic, 
and physical theories, such as Newtonian physics (Carnap 1966, 237). In the case of the 
former, there is no obligation on the scientist to supply a physical interpretation for the 
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framework in question, since Peano Arithmetic by itself does not purport to describe 
anything in the world. On the contrary, such a physical interpretation is required in the 
case of the latter, insofar as a physical theories purport to describe events in the world. As 
we shall see in §4.4, this difference in the presumptive burden between a scientist 
working with a purely formal system using Carnap’s frameworks and one using them to 
articulate a physical theory translates into two methods of addressing questions 
concerning the status of theoretical entities within a linguistic framework. 
 
4.1 Quine and the tribunal of experience 
Quine’s response to concerns regarding the grounding of theoretical entities in 
science, including mathematics, is rooted in his famous rejection of the analytic–synthetic 
distinction (1951) that forms part of his theory of meaning. According to one formulation 
of this distinction, analytic propositions are true by mere virtue of the meaning or the 
logical form of their constituent terms, whereas synthetic propositions are not. In my 
description of his view on the issue, I will only engage as much of Quine’s criticism of 
Carnap as is pertinent for my purposes here, especially since his attack on the latter has 
been extensively discussed in the literature.56 In particular, I will not detail or assess 
Quine’s arguments against the analytic–synthetic distinction, nor will I evaluate his 
                                                 
56 See, for instance, George (2000) and Stein (1992) for opinions on the issue that I find compelling. 
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reasons for subscribing to the various philosophical positions that lead him to adopt the 
perspective on science that I describe below.57 
Quine thinks that language is “a social art, which we all acquire on the evidence solely 
of other people’s overt behaviour under publicly recognisable circumstances” (1968, 
185). His empiricism assumes a commitment to behaviourism about meaning: meaning is 
nothing other than is manifest in behaviour. By using an elaborate thought-experiment 
involving the construction by a linguist of a translation manual between English and a 
novel foreign language, Quine shows that it is possible to devise a number of such 
manuals that, while mutually inconsistent, are all harmonious with empirical evidence 
exemplified as behaviour. Hence, it is possible to assign varying, contradictory meanings 
to the same sentences in different translation manuals such that they are all consistent 
with experience. Insofar as experience of behaviour is the sole arbiter of meaning, there is 
thus no fact of the matter about meaning (Quine 1960, 74). This is known as Quine’s 
indeterminacy thesis. Note that if there is no fact of the matter about meaning, the notion 
of a class of statements that are true by virtue of their meaning—the definition of 
analyticity with which Quine takes issue in his criticism of Carnap—is rendered 
nonsensical. Furthermore, if the indeterminacy thesis is correct, then there is no fact of 
the matter about what the speaker meant when he/she says “Rabbit,” say. If there is no 
fact of the matter about what the speaker meant when he/she says “Rabbit,” there is no 
fact of the matter about whether the speaker is referring to a rabbit, a stage in the life of a 
rabbit, or a physical part of a rabbit (1987, 127-8). This is known as the inscrutability of 
                                                 
57 For Quine’s behaviourism-based thesis regarding the “indeterminacy of translation” and the 
consequent “inscrutability of reference,” see Quine (1960, Ch. 2). For an elaboration of its implications for 
his relativistic ontology, see Quine (1969). 
  92 
reference—the Quinean thesis that “referents of terms in a language and the range of 
quantifiers are not determined by physical or behavioural facts” (Hookway 1988, 141). 
Quine’s solution to the issue of referential inscrutability is the relativity of ontology. This 
is the view that there is no absolute fact of the matter about the ontological commitments 
of a language or a theory (Hookway 1988, 25). This means that reference in language 
makes sense only relative to a linguistic framework. It would be meaningless to inquire 
about the meaning of terms absolutely; such an inquiry can be made only relative to a 
background language (Quine 1969, 200). Quine’s epistemological holism concerning all 
knowledge, which I detail below, and his conformational holism in the context of 
scientific theories, which I summarise in §4.3 while discussing the Indispensability 
Argument, are grounded in this view of language and meaning. 
Another Quinean commitment that is critical to shaping his view of the ontology of 
theoretical entities in scientific theories is his naturalism. He writes: 
Naturalism: abandonment of the goal of a first philosophy. It sees natural science as an inquiry into 
reality, fallible and corrigible but not answerable to any supra-scientific tribunal, and not in need of any 
justification beyond observation and the hypothetico-deductive method.  (Quine 1981, 67) 
 
There appear to be two facets to this view of naturalism. The first is the rejection of 
foundational epistemic enterprises of the kind undertaken by Descartes, which seek to 
ground all knowledge on principles that are known with absolute certainty. Such projects 
assume a privileged office for philosophy as seeking to justify our successes in science by 
providing a firm basis for its epistemology. Note that Quine takes Carnap’s plan for the 
rational reconstruction of science as an instance of such foundationalist endeavours. The 
second aspect of his naturalism is a commitment to science as our best means of learning 
the nature of the world and, thus, determining the contents of our ontology. The reference 
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to the hypothetico-deductive method in the above quote indicates that Quine embraces all 
generally recognised sciences as falling within the ambit of science proper. 
Quine’s holism and naturalism in conjunction determine his view of the status of 
theoretical entities. According to his epistemological holism, there is no fundamental 
distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori, the logical and the factual, the 
analytic and the synthetic (Friedman 2001, 32). Our system of knowledge should be 
viewed as a vast network of interconnected beliefs where experience only impinges along 
the periphery. The centre of this network is occupied by the formal, theoretical 
components of our knowledge that are not modified or replaced often, such as rules of 
logic and the postulates of scientific theories that are current. If, as Quine claims, the 
analytic–synthetic distinction does not hold, there is no difference in kind between 
theoretical/analytic claims and observational/synthetic58 ones. Hence, “our statements 
about the external world face the tribunal of experience not individually, but as a 
corporate body” (Quine 1951, 38). That is, both the theoretical and empirical components 
of scientific theories are beholden to empirical verification. He likens “total science,” 
which constitutes our structured knowledge of the world, to a force field the boundary 
conditions of which are constituted by experience. A conflict with experience at the 
periphery occasions adjustments in the interior of the field: truth values have to be 
redistributed over some of the statements. However, the total field of science is so 
underdetermined by its boundary conditions—experience—that there is considerable 
                                                 
58 Strictly speaking, synthetic propositions are not identical to empirical propositions. The former are 
defined as not being true merely by virtue of the meanings of their constitutive terms, whereas the latter are 
simply based on experience. Hence, a synthetic proposition is not necessarily empirical. For instance, Kant 
regarded geometry as synthetic (and a priori) but not empirical. See (Carnap 1966, 267) for the suggestion 
that Carnap does not respect this distinction. 
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leeway in the choice of statements to reconsider in light of any single infirming 
experience. This is because no particular experience is linked to specific formal 
statements that occupy the interior of this field or “web of belief” (Quine and Ullian, 
1978), except indirectly through the consideration of coherence and consistency affecting 
the entire field (Quine 1951, 39). Hence, it becomes folly to seek a boundary between 
synthetic statements, which hold contingently based on experience, and analytic 
statements, which hold come what may. Any statement can be held to be true if we make 
sufficiently drastic changes elsewhere in the system. Quine thinks that taken collectively, 
science is dependent on language and experience, but this dual dependence is not 
traceable in the statements of science one by one. The unit of empirical significance is the 
whole of science. Empirical evidence spreads over a conjunction of all elements of our 
total system of science. 
Quine thinks that total science is extremely underdetermined by experience, but the 
edge of our web of belief must nonetheless be kept consistent with it. The remainder, 
with all its elaborate “myths or fictions,” be it mathematics or the Homeric gods, one 
translation manual or another, has as its objective the simplicity of the relevant laws 
(1951, 42). That is, so long as our theories agree with empirical observation, the ontology 
underlying them is determined based on pragmatic values, since there is no fact of the 
matter about the “correctness” or “truth” of rival ontologies that are all consistent with 
experience. Our natural tendency to disrupt the total system as little as possible would 
lead us to focus on empirical statements for our revision, since these are closer to the 
periphery of our web and, hence, emendations to them are likely to be far less turbulent 
for the enterprise of science than some statement—at the centre of the web—more 
  95 
important to the theoretical integrity of our (set of) beliefs that ground the system, e.g., 
the law of the excluded middle. Crucially, on this view, ontological questions, including 
those pertaining to mathematical entities, are on par with questions of natural science. For 
instance, the question of whether to countenance classes as entities is simply one of 
whether to quantify over variables that admit classes as values. In this conception, the 
only way to make ontological commitments is by using bound variables (Quine 1953, 31-
2): “to be is, purely and simply, to be the value of a variable.” This heuristic59 is used to 
determine the ontological claims made by a particular theory. Hence, “a theory is 
committed to those and only those entities to which the bound variables the theory must 
be capable of referring in order that the affirmations made in the theory be true” (Quine 
1953, 33). 
Quine grants that certain beliefs, such as those of logic and arithmetic, are relatively 
central in the web, whereas others, such as those of biology, are relatively peripheral. 
However, this only means that the former are less likely to be revised than the latter in 
case of recalcitrant experiences at the periphery. On such a view, Quine claims, the 
difference between the existence of classes, say, and that of physical objects is only one 
of degree, in that it turns on our pragmatic inclination to adjust one strand of the “fabric 
of science” rather than another in accommodating some recalcitrant experience. Hence, 
Quine advocates a more rabid and thoroughgoing pragmatism than that espoused by 
Carnap. 
 
                                                 
59 I use this word, instead of “rule” or “principle,” because in spite of his remarkable facility with 
language, Quine maintains a frustrating glibness with regard to this and other critical components of his 
philosophy. 
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4.2 Carnap on the justification of theoretical entities 
A physicist who is suspicious of abstract entities may perhaps try to declare a certain part of the 
language of physics as uninterpreted and uninterpretable, that part which refers to real numbers as 
space-time coordinates or as values of physical magnitudes, to functions, limits, etc. More 
probably he will just speak about all these things like anybody else but with an uneasy conscience, 
like a man who in his everyday life does with qualms many things which are not in accord with 
the high moral principles he professes on Sundays. 
 (Carnap 1992, 72) 
 
Unsurprisingly, Carnap takes up the issue of the status of abstract entities in the 
context of his linguistic frameworks for science. The sum of his stance is that the use of a 
formal language that refers to abstract (theoretical) entities does not imply the acceptance 
of a Platonic (realist) epistemology, and is perfectly compatible with empiricism and 
strictly scientific thinking (Carnap 1992, 73). Recall that for Carnap, in order to speak in 
his or her language about a new kind of entity, one needs to introduce a system of novel 
ways of speaking subject to new rules. This system is a linguistic framework. Carnap 
makes two crucial distinctions in the context of his frameworks. The first is between 
formal/analytic sentences, which correspond to logical or “L-rules” in his framework, and 
empirical/synthetic ones, which correspond to physical or “P-rules.” The second 
distinction is that between internal and external questions (Friedman 2001, 32). 
According to Carnap, there are two kinds of questions concerning the reality of 
entities: i) questions regarding the existence of certain new kinds of entities within the 
framework—internal questions—and ii) those concerning the existence or reality of the 
system of entities as a whole—external questions (Carnap 1992, 73). Internal questions 
and possible answers to them are formulated using the new forms of expression, either 
through purely logical methods or empirical ones, depending on whether the question is a 
logical or a factual one, respectively. “Reality” with regard to internal questions is an 
empirical, scientific, and non-metaphysical concept. To recognise something as a real 
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thing or event means to successfully incorporate it into the system of things at a particular 
space-time position such that it fits with other things recognised as real according to the 
rules of the framework. External questions, on the other hand, concern the reality of the 
world hypothesised by the framework itself.60 
Carnap claims that all standards concerning notions such as “correctness,” “validity,” 
and “truth” are relative to the logical rules definitive of the framework. Thus, it makes no 
sense to ask whether one’s choice of a framework is “valid” or “true” because the logical 
rules on the basis of which these notions are defined are not yet in place (Friedman 2001, 
31). He claims that disputes in philosophy concerning external questions about the 
ontological status of theoretical entities arise because these questions are framed in an 
inappropriate manner. To be “real” in the scientific sense means to be an element of the 
system. Hence, this concept cannot be applied to the system itself, which forms the 
subject of external questions. However, if one chooses to accept a framework, this must 
not be interpreted as belief in the reality of the framework: there is no such belief or 
assumption because the relevant question is not an internal question. To accept a 
framework means nothing more than to accept a certain form of language, to accept rules 
for forming and testing propositions in order to accept or reject them (Carnap 1992, 74). 
At the same time, on the basis of observation, the acceptance of a certain framework 
leads to the acceptance of, or a belief in, the assertion of certain propositions. Decisions 
regarding the acceptance or rejection of a framework will be influenced by theoretical 
                                                 
60 Prof DiSalle has pointed out to me that this is only the metaphysical interpretation of external 
questions— Carnap remarks wryly that such questions are raised “neither by the man in the street nor by 
scientists, but only by philosophers” (Carnap 1964, 241). External questions might instead concern the 
pragmatic value of using a framework, or the comparative pragmatic values of different frameworks. 
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knowledge, and the intended purpose of the framework will determine the factors 
relevant to this decision. For instance, having introduced a set of rules related to defining 
and performing operations on the natural numbers, the question “Is there a prime greater 
than 100?” is an internal question that is answered by logical analysis—a proof— and 
yields an analytic answer instead of one based on observation. Similarly, the answer to 
the question “Are there numbers?” is, rather trivially, “Yes!” if the question is construed 
as an internal question because the relevant rules added to the framework in order to 
allow the use of numbers establish their existence in the framework. Hence, when asking 
questions regarding the existence of theoretical entities such as numbers, philosophers, 
such as Quineans, presumably do not mean to ask an internal question. In fact, they 
would readily admit that they are asking a question that is conceptually prior to the 
acceptance of a new framework. These may be posed as questions regarding the 
ontological status of numbers, some ideal reality, and suchlike inquiries. These questions 
have not thus been formulated in scientific language. Hence, the above external 
questions, and possible answers to them, have no cognitive content. Until this is supplied, 
we are justified in regarding this as a pseudo-question, a non-theoretical inquiry disguised 
as a theoretical one. In this context, this is expressed as the practical question of whether 
to incorporate the relevant system of entities into our linguistic framework. 
Hence, for all questions related to the status of abstract entities in the framework, 
responses are readily available through formal or empirical methods incorporated into the 
framework if the question is construed as an internal one (Carnap 1992, 75). The only 
feasible interpretation of these questions as external to the framework leads to their 
reformulation as pragmatic inquiries concerning the effectiveness of the entity in question 
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in fulfilling the intended purpose of the framework (Carnap 1992, 77). Critics of the use 
of abstract entities in semantics overlook the fundamental difference between the 
acceptance of a system of entities and an assertion internal to the system, e.g., that there 
are elephants, electrons, etc. Whoever makes an internal assertion is obliged to justify it 
by providing the necessary evidence, empirical in the case of electrons and elephants, 
formal proof in the case of numbers. Hence, the demand for a theoretical justification, 
appropriate in the case of internal assertions, is sometimes incorrectly applied to the 
acceptance of a system of entities (Carnap 1992, 81). For instance, with regard to 
disagreements among philosophers over the status of numbers, Carnap feels compelled to 
regard the relevant external question—“Do numbers exist?”—as a pseudo-question until 
both parties to the argument offer a common interpretation of the question in scientific 
language as a cognitive question. This would involve an indication of possible evidence 
regarded by each side as having a bearing on deciding the issue. 
 
4.3 The fruitfulness of ontological inquiry 
Trends of research in several areas of the philosophy of science in the last few decades 
indicate that a large number of scholars in the English-speaking tradition have sided with 
Quine on the issue of the justification of theoretical entities, including mathematical ones. 
In particular, the Quinean slogan “to be is to be the value of a variable,” in conjunction 
with his epistemological holism and naturalism, have prompted a long dispute over the 
status of mathematical entities, called the Indispensability Argument debate, that persists 
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to this day. The argument is attributed to Quine (1976, 1980a, b, 1981a) and Hilary 
Putnam (1979a, b).61 It is as follows (Colyvan 2001, 11): 
1. We ought to be ontologically committed to all and only those entities that are 
indispensable to our best scientific theories. 
2. Mathematical entities are indispensable to our best scientific theories. 
Therefore: 
3. We ought to be ontologically committed to mathematical entities. 
The crucial first premise of the argument relies on Quine’s naturalism and his 
confirmation holism described in §4.1. Quinean naturalism rejects metaphysics as first 
philosophy, and views the project of philosophy as continuous with that of science, which 
tells us what the world is like. It is only proper, thus, that we look to our scientific 
theories to determine our ontological commitments. The doctrine of conformational 
holism claims that theories are confirmed or disconfirmed in their entirety, and not 
piecemeal. Hence, if empirical evidence confirms or infirms the hypotheses of a theory, 
the entire theory, including its mathematical component, is verified or falsified, 
respectively. As mentioned in §4.1, I will not consider and evaluate these assumptions in 
part because they have been extensively treated in the literature, and I have nothing to 
add to this.62 Furthermore, critiques of Quinean naturalism and confirmation holism, in 
light of the looseness and generality with which they are employed in the Indispensability 
                                                 
61 Liggins (2008) has claimed that the argument for the indispensability of mathematical entities 
actually offered by Quine is different from that ascribed to him in the literature. However, even if Liggins 
is correct, the differences he cites between the original Quinean argument and that associated with him 
have no bearing on my reasoning here. 
62 For other views, see Parsons (1983) and Laudan (1990) on conformational holism. See Gregory 
(2011) and Haack (1993) for contrasting views on Quine’s naturalism. 
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Argument, have shown that these theses are suspect at best. My own views on the issue 
are influenced by Wilson.63 
So, the first premise states that we should be guided by prevalent scientific theories 
with regard to our ontological commitments, and the confirmation of a theory directly 
confirms all of its theoretical components, including the mathematics used. The argument 
has been hotly debated by realists, anti-realists, as well as instrumentalists over the 
years.64 Over time, the realist claim has evolved into an “Enhanced Indispensability 
Argument,” which is as follows (Baker 2005, 613): 
1. We ought rationally to believe in the existence of any entity that plays an 
indispensable explanatory role in our best scientific theories. 
2. Mathematical objects play an indispensable explanatory role in science. 
3. Hence, we ought rationally to believe in the existence of mathematical objects. 
This argument seeks to be more specific about the contribution that mathematics 
makes to our scientific theories and representation in order to bolster the ontological 
claim. 
It is notable that each of the above arguments contains a first premise that invokes the 
abovementioned assumptions due to Quine. Hence, debate on the issue has been 
legitimised through the participants’ acquiescence to Quinean holism as well as his 
insistence on experience as the sole arbiter of all knowledge—his naturalism. Once it is 
granted that all knowledge, theoretical as well as empirical, is subject to a uniform 
                                                 
63 For Wilson’s critique of Quinean holism, see (2006, Chapter 5, §xii). For his objection to Quine’s 
naturalism, see (Ladyman et al. 2013, 198-207). 
64 See, for instance, Maddy (1997) and Pincock (2004). 
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standard of evidence, and the distinction between the formal components of a framework 
and its empirical content is rejected, it becomes kosher to seek and locate justifications 
for the existence of theoretical entities. That is, philosophers inquiring into extra-formal 
justification of the formal, analytic components of a theory or a linguistic framework are 
siding with Quine in his rejection of the analytic–synthetic distinction, and endorsing the 
so-called tribunal of experience as the proper setting to ground the formal as well as 
empirical content of our theories. This is all well and good, but for the fact that no one, 
from Platonist mathematicians such as Gödel to the participants of the Indispensability 
Argument debate, has proposed a framework for the conception and articulation of 
empirical evidence for or against formal claims. A formal proof as justification of such 
claims is presumably unsatisfactory to the Quinean due to its remoteness from 
experience. Quine occasionally writes of “experiential meaning” (1963, 389) to be 
assigned to the formal components of frameworks in order to justify them. However, 
neither he nor any other thinker has detailed or even outlined a proper method to do so 
satisfactorily. And it is important to note that this is precisely Carnap’s objection. He 
writes: 
Unfortunately, these philosophers have so far not given a formulation of their question in terms of the 
common scientific language. Therefore our judgment must be that they have not succeeded in giving to 
the external question and to the possible answers any cognitive content. Unless and until they supply a 
clear cognitive interpretation, we are justified in our suspicion that their question is a pseudo-question, 
that is, one disguised in the form of a theoretical question while in fact it is non-theoretical … 
(Carnap 1992, 75) 
 
“Common scientific language” in the above can be read as the language and 
epistemology of one’s choice to represent the relevant scientific knowledge. In addition 
to his complaint concerning the failure of philosophers to meaningfully articulate 
ontological questions of this kind, it is interesting to note that in the above quote, Carnap 
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does not dismiss out of hand the possibility of the development of methods or 
frameworks in which such inquiries can be meaningfully and fruitfully made. Carnap’s 
objection is methodological: philosophers involved in debates regarding the status of 
abstract entities, be it in the contemporary Indispensability Argument debate, the disputes 
concerning scientific realism from a few decades ago,65 or even the problem of universals 
of old, have not even managed to arrive at an agreement regarding an appropriate manner 
of conceptualising these issues, let alone investigate them to the satisfaction of scientific 
standards that are more widely accepted. Hence, engaging in debates on these issues 
without a common, robust methodology to settle the problem is tantamount to putting the 
cart before the horse. Furthermore, the implication in the above quote is that Carnap 
would be more than willing to accept these questions if, in the future, they are rendered 
susceptible to meaningful articulation. Such a generous attitude to an ill-formed dispute is 
further testament to Carnapian tolerance in what he regards as a pragmatic issue in 
science. 
One possible route to rendering meaningful the ontological questions regarding 
mathematical entities is to develop a language containing a uniform account of notions 
such as “meaning,” “reference,” “truth,” etc., for all concepts in the language, whether 
formal or not. Benacerraf (1973) outlines a few conditions for a project of this kind, 
which incidentally presumes a variety of naturalism, but this has not been pursued any 
further in the context of the justification of theoretical entities in scientific theories. Until 
such an all-encompassing theory is developed, a Carnapian attitude to these questions is 
justified. 
                                                 
65 See Boyd (1984) for the classic formulation of the thesis of scientific realism. 
  104 
My discussion of Maxwell’s equations of electromagnetism in §3.5 showed, among 
other things, that Carnapian frameworks are well suited to represent scientific theories in 
general, and theories of physics in particular, due to the cleavage therein between a 
highly mathematised theoretical component and empirical content, to which it is related 
through rules of correspondence. Specifically, my discussion showed how Carnapian 
frameworks can accommodate novel theoretical entities. We saw that Maxwell’s 
modification of Ampere’s circuital law by adding displacement current density to 
describe the induction of magnetic fields due to changing electric fields is easily 
accommodated by a modified Carnapian framework, which assigns to the new term a 
definite meaning in terms of other theoretical concepts through the C-rules, and hence 
provides a method to measure it as well. In contrast to this, Quine’s prescriptions contain 
little detail beyond the repeated insistence on an extreme empiricism. This is particularly 
problematic in the case of a drastic innovation in science that requires the rejection of a 
prevalent theory in favour of another. While this seems to pose no problem for Carnapian 
frameworks, as I showed for Maxwell’s groundbreaking work, no such methodology is 
forthcoming in Quine’s work. The closest he approaches to considering such 
revolutionary changes in total science is to note that in the face of obstinate evidence, his 
epistemic holism allows for alterations to be made elsewhere in the web of belief in order 
to preserve the centre, where the formal, theoretical components of our knowledge reside, 
as described in §4.1. Apart from inciting debates that appear to promise scant 
philosophical fruit, which, if anything, is harmful to the discipline, the Quinean 
perspective offers no comprehensive plan for pursuing an epistemological enterprise as 
bold as the one he proclaims. 
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4.4 Carnap’s view of theoretical terms and the atomic 
hypothesis 
Thus far in this chapter, I have shown that Carnap’s approach to the status of 
theoretical entities in scientific representation is fruitful for philosophical inquiry in a 
number of ways, particularly in contrast to the views espoused by Quine. Not only are 
frameworks of the kind proposed by Carnap amenable to representing scientific theories, 
and theories of physics in particular, they also help distinguish issues that can be resolved 
within the resources of a given theoretical framework from those that cannot. This is 
accomplished by means of the corresponding distinction between questions that are 
internal to a framework and those external to it. Among other things, this apparatus 
allows us to identify certain concerns that have been posed as ontological puzzles 
pertaining to the nature of the theoretical entities employed in science as misguided or 
confused. This confusion may arise through a misunderstanding of the aims of science, 
the content of theories and their relation to experimentation, the scope and limitations of 
the claims made by theories, or, in the case of representative debates in the philosophy of 
science, a failure to investigate and appreciate the practice and methodologies of science 
in order to provide much-needed context. Sections 3.6 and 3.7 developed this in some 
detail. Debates in the literature on scientific realism and the Indispensability Argument, 
summarised in §4.3, are exemplars. For these are cases where both realists and 
nominalists have engaged each other for decades without a clear idea of the formulation 
of the problem in the varying contexts in question, the methods to pursue in order to 
arrive at a solution to the problem once it is formulated, and, most importantly, the 
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significance of possible solutions to the problem for science and the philosophy of 
science. I have also shown in the foregoing that these futile debates in the literature can 
be traced to a subscription to a Quinean approach to questions of ontology. 
In spite of the above, the impression that the Carnapian approach to the status of 
theoretical entities is incorrect has proven to be considerably resilient in the literature. 
The theoretical and experimental research that led to the discovery of the atom in the 
early 20th century has recently been used as an instance. The claim is that a consideration 
of the research that led to the verification of the atomic hypothesis reveals that Carnap’s 
attitude towards theoretical entities unfairly trivialises questions of their existence to ones 
of the choice of linguistic framework. Such a perspective unreasonably undermines the 
importance of such epistemological scientific achievements and hence misrepresents 
them. In the following, I will consider two recent treatments of the issue, by Maddy and 
Demopoulos. A reason for choosing this particular instance is that these two thinkers 
conveniently fall, roughly speaking, along the Quinean and the Carnapian sides, 
respectively, of the philosophical divide on the consideration of theoretical entities in 
science. This choice is additionally useful because I think that Maddy’s understanding of 
Carnap’s enterprise and its details evinces misconceptions that are widespread in the 
literature and, although I will not pursue this issue here, should be considered 
representative. Demopoulos does not accept Maddy’s analysis of Carnap but agrees that 
the atomic hypothesis poses a problem for him. The general conclusion to be drawn from 
my consideration of Demopoulos’ remarks is that Carnap’s distinction between internal 
and external questions in its original form is sufficient to address the above concerns. 
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At the turn of the 20th century, there was considerable disagreement about the kinetic 
theory of gases and fluids. This theory describes fluids as composed of a very large 
number of subatomic particles in constant random motion. Contrasted to this was the 
thermodynamical approach espoused by Mach, Ostwald, and Duhem. Emboldened by the 
success in physics and chemistry of thermodynamical approaches, which abstract from 
and are independent of the underlying structure of matter, these thinkers were sceptical of 
commitment to a theory of matter based on invisible and undetectable particles.66  
In the second of his four ground breaking papers in 1905, Albert Einstein derived an 
equation for the diffusion of particles through a fluid and speculated that this occurs 
through Brownian motion. In his analysis, he assumed Maxwell–Boltzmann statistics and 
its relation to the molecular–kinetic theory of heat. In a series of ingenious experiments 
starting in the same year, Jean Perrin was successfully able to measure the density 
distribution, the mean displacement, and the mean rotation of Brownian particles in a 
solution. Crucially, through several different methods, he was able to determine the value 
of Avagadro’s number—the number of particles in a mole of a substance—to an accuracy 
of within a few percentage points of contemporary estimates. This confirmed the 
correctness of the kinetic theory and, hence, established the existence of atoms. 
To clarify her criticism of Carnap’s attitude towards theoretical entities in 
representational systems, Maddy (2008) asks us to consider the following scenario: 
[S]uppose we’ve adopted a linguistic framework for simple scientific observation and generalization—
perhaps an elaboration of the thing language—and we’re wondering whether or not to embrace a new 
range of entities, say atoms. As our current language has no terms for such things, no predicate ‘is an 
                                                 
66 This was but one reason for their scepticism. Their objections to the kinetic theory were far more 
nuanced, involving practical considerations as well as the concern to maintain consistency with well-
established empirical laws at the time. See Chalmers (2009) for an excellent treatment of the history of the 
atom. 
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atom’, no evidential rules with which to settle questions of their existence or nature, Carnap holds that 
this is not a question that can be asked or answered internally, that we must step outside our linguistic 
framework and address it pragmatically, as a conventional decision about whether or not to adopt a new 
linguistic framework. This new framework would include new evidential rules linking various 
indicators to the presence of atoms, just as the thing language includes evidence rules linking various 
experiences to the existence of ordinary objects. … [T]he meticulous and decisive work of Jean Perrin 
on Brownian motion came as a welcome surprise. In circumstances like these, where the new evidential 
rules are such elusive and hard-won scientific achievements, the Second Philosopher is unlikely to 
agree with Carnap that their adoption is a purely pragmatic matter, a conventional choice of one 
language over another. Instead, she insists that the development of the Einstein/Perrin evidence was of a 
piece with her standard methods of inquiry, that it required careful examination and justification of the 
usual sorts. … [Even if] the empirical study of human language use might justify some notion of purely 
linguistic truth, [the Second Philosopher] doubts that a distinction so grounded would put the relevance 
of Einstein/Perrin’s work to the existence of atoms on the linguistic side of the ledger.  
(Maddy 2008, 71-2) 
 
There are a number of explicit and implicit issues of interest in the above, but I will 
confine my observations to the extent required by my purposes here. The thrust of 
Maddy’s argument is that in the context of his framework, Carnap would regard Perrin’s 
crucial experiments to prove the existence of the atom merely as one of many choices 
that need to be made in the adoption of a language for the corresponding theory. This 
serves to reduce the question of the existence of the atom, a significant cause for dispute 
at the time, as well as Perrin’s experiments to settle it, to one of which framework to use 
based on pragmatic considerations. This militates strongly against the intuition, well 
grounded in science, that this issue is one of ontology, of what does and does not exist. 
That Carnap considers this a problem concerning the pragmatics of language choice is 
sufficient, Maddy thinks, for us to reject his stance on the status of theoretical entities. 
Thought experiments serve as a powerful tool for conceptual analysis in science and 
philosophy, and a rich tradition attests to their usefulness in such inquiries. At the same 
time, there is a widespread tendency in philosophy to forget that the major purpose of 
thought experiments is to clarify and refine our pre-theoretic concepts in order to develop 
general methodological principles for subsequent research in the field in question. 
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Instead, it is common among philosophers to employ these for largely critical and 
invariably superficial analyses of proposals in numerous areas of philosophy without 
considering their details.67 Hence, I think it pertinent to explore the thought experiment 
offered by Maddy above in order to evaluate the merit of her criticism. 
In the context of a Carnapian framework, Maddy asks us to consider a situation where 
a new kind of entity is being posited, for which there is no theoretical or relevant 
observational apparatus in our language. This is problematic with respect to betraying a 
misunderstanding of Carnap’s frameworks in two ways. First, it is important to remember 
that these frameworks are not intended for use in scientific practice: We know that most 
scientists do not know or care about them; nor does Carnap prescribe the use of his 
frameworks to scientists to formulate theories. They are instead intended for a rational 
reconstruction of these theories in a meticulous and regimented manner, so that the 
numerous assumptions and inferences implicit in the relevant theoretical and 
experimental procedures are laid bare. Hence, the hypothetical question of the application 
of Carnap’s framework to Einstein’s analysis of Brownian motion or Perrin’s 
experiments at the time that they were conducted is one that is irrelevant to its purpose. 
Hence, the thought experiment fails to get off the ground in the first place. The second 
manner in which Maddy’s thought experiment misconstrues Carnap’s frameworks is a 
consequence of the first. The fact that these frameworks are neither used in scientific 
practice nor, a fortiori, in the context of the discovery of novel theoretical entities blunts 
Maddy’s criticism by denying the burden that she seeks to impose on them. Her objection 
                                                 
67 See, for instance, Horgan and Timmons’ (1992a, 1992b, 1993) use of the twin Earth thought 
experiment to argue against Boyd’s moral realism. 
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draws its strength from the idea that while using a framework in the backdrop of research 
concerning a novel theoretical entity, it is counter-intuitive to the point of courting 
absurdity for a scientist to consider the issue of incorporating the relevant theoretical 
machinery, correspondence rules, experimental procedures, and so on, as a pragmatic 
choice of language. However, once it is clear that this is not the proper setting for the 
employment of such frameworks, we are no longer required, as Maddy enjoins us, to 
think of the question of the existence of atoms as one of choice of language. In the 
context of the rational reconstruction of a theory—the proper context for the application 
of such frameworks—the need for an appropriate linguistic framework translates into one 
that contains the logical, mathematical, and methodological resources required to 
represent the phenomena at hand. In case of the atomic hypothesis, for instance, this 
requires a framework that can represent the kinetic theory along with its underlying 
assumptions—the Maxwell–Boltzmann statistics, the equipartition of the energy of the 
particles in Brownian motion, and so on—formulate experimental methods that can be 
used to test the theoretical hypothesis, and develop appropriate correspondence rules to 
link them. Such a framework is needed in order to represent the theory, and Maddy 
should have no objection to this. 
While he agrees that Maddy’s criticism of Carnap’s frameworks is mistaken, 
Demopoulos (2012, Ch. 3) is keen to the force of an argument that lurks underneath her 
thought but requires some development. He uses the idea of the Ramsey sentence to 
clarify this argument. The assumption underlying Ramsey sentences is one of a theory the 
non-logical vocabulary of which has been divided into theoretical and observational 
terms. Consider such a theory TC: 
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(TC)  [T1, T2, …; O1, O2, …]
68 
where T1, T2, … represent theoretical terms and O1, O2, … represent observational 
terms. The Ramsey sentence of this theory is formed by existentially generalising over all 
theoretical terms: 
(TCR)  ∃X1, ∃X2, … [X1, X2, …; O1, O2, …] 
The crucial feature of TCR is that theoretical terms have been eliminated from it. 
Furthermore, TC and TCR are equivalent in that anything that follows from the former 
also follows from the latter. Hence, the Ramsified theory TCR has the same explanatory 
and predictive power as the original theory TC. Ramsey wanted to show that it is possible 
to formulate any theory in a language that does not require theoretical terms but conveys 
the same observational content. The motivation underlying such a move is that if 
theoretical entities can be eliminated from the expression of a theory without affecting its 
content, it can help avoid repugnant metaphysical speculation. 
With this machinery in place, Demopoulos poses a puzzle for Carnap (2012, 66). 
Given any theory, an archetypal realist and an instrumentalist69 would agree on its 
observational reports or consequences. Given its Ramsey-sentence reconstruction, the 
theory is reduced to nothing but its observational consequences. Hence, both the realist 
and the instrumentalist would agree on the content of the Ramsified theory. In such a 
                                                 
68 I have omitted symbolism for correspondence rules because this is not important here. 
69 Following Carnap (1966, 255), I define a realist as someone who thinks of theoretical entities posited 
by our scientific theories as “actual” in some supra-theoretic sense. An instrumentalist, by contrast, is 
someone who views theories, and theoretical entities by implication, as tools to organise observed 
phenomena that are useful but not “true.” 
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case, Carnap must conclude that the two disagree on an external question. However, 
Demopoulos writes: 
[C]arnap’s deployment of his Ramsey-sentence reconstruction should strike us as unsatisfactory: it 
portrays the question of the reality of unobservables as metaphysical; hence, one that should be 
transformed into a question of preference for theoretical vocabulary. But then it is difficult to see how 
the question of the reality of atoms—which are just a special case of unobservables—should not also be 
regarded as a question of linguistic preference. This is to relinquish at the level of the realism–
instrumentalism debate everything we struggled to sustain in connection with the work of Einstein and 
Perrin, since it leaves Carnap open to the charge that the question the atomic hypothesis raises can be 
settled by a choice of language. 
(Demopoulos 2012, 66) 
 
Hence, given the Ramsified theory, Carnap is faced with a choice of modifying or 
abandoning his distinction between internal and external questions, or maintaining on 
pain of absurdity that questions pertaining to the existence of theoretical entities, such as 
the atom, amount to no more than inquiries regarding the choice of framework. This 
argument highlights Maddy’s concern as well. Demopoulos thinks that Carnap does not 
have a satisfactory response to it, and hence formulates one on his behalf by extending 
the distinction between internal and external questions in the spirit of Carnap.70 
I propose and defend a modification of Carnap’s project for the rational reconstruction 
of science in Chapter 3 because I think that problems persist in this mature view. 
However, I do not think that the concern shared by Maddy and Demopoulos is one of 
these, and hence an appropriate response to it can in fact be found in Carnap’s work. 
While explaining correspondence rules in his Philosophical Foundations of Physics 
(1966, 234), Carnap claims that a theoretical entity can never be explicitly defined in 
terms of observational content. He then writes: 
There is no answer to the question: “Exactly what is an electron?” Later we shall come back to this 
question, because it is the kind that philosophers are always asking scientists. They want the physicist to 
                                                 
70 While I will not discuss it here, I should mention that I find Demopoulos’ solution unsatisfactory. 
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tell them just what he means by “electricity,” “magnetism,” “gravity,” “a molecule.” If the physicist 
explains them in theoretical terms, the philosopher may be disappointed. “That is not what I meant at 
all,” he will say. “I want you to tell me, in ordinary language, what those terms mean.” 
 
The claim here is that philosophers erroneously burden the scientist with providing 
definitions of highly theoretical terms such as the above in ordinary language, abstracted 
from the theoretical framework in which they are developed, verified, and subsequently 
used. Carnap thinks that the question here is improperly phrased. When a child asks what 
an elephant is, we can tell the child that it is a large animal with big ears, and can even 
show a picture. The temptation among philosophers is, by analogy, to think that 
theoretical terms can be similarly defined in familiar terms. We can describe an elephant 
as a large animal with certain characteristics. Why can we not do the same with an 
electron, say? 
The answer is that a physicist can describe the behaviour of an electron only by stating theoretical 
laws, and these laws contain only theoretical terms. They describe the field produced by an 
electron, the reaction of an electron to a field, and so on. If an electron is in an electrostatic field, 
its velocity will accelerate in a certain way. Unfortunately, the electron’s acceleration is an 
unobservable. It is not like the acceleration of a billiard ball, which can be studied by direct 
observation. 
(Carnap 1966, ibid.) 
 
Hence, what Carnap is resisting here is a definition and description of theoretical 
terms in a language alien to the ones in which they have been formulated, a context 
foreign to that in which they are designed to feature and function, and vocabulary that is 
simply not susceptible to yielding a precise or useful description. My suggestion is that 
Carnap’s resistance to definitions of theoretical entities in ordinary language is of a piece 
with his prescription to distinguish between internal and external questions pertaining to a 
linguistic framework. Both are motivated in part by the concern that speaking of highly 
abstract concepts beyond the context of a scientific theory in a language ill-suited for this 
is inaccurate, unrepresentative of the nature of a “reality” beyond the medium of 
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interpretation provided by the relevant theory, and can easily lead to the development of 
erroneous beliefs through misuse. This is reminiscent of Carnap’s discussion of 
philosophical concerns regarding the reality of numbers in “Empiricism, Semantics and 
Ontology” (Carnap 1992, 75). When philosophers ask whether there are numbers, they 
are not asking whether a linguistic framework in which numbers have been accepted will, 
if accepted, be found to contain any. Instead, they are making a pre-theoretic inquiry that 
is conceptually prior to the adoption of one or another framework. It is such inquiries that 
Carnap resists and wants to discourage. This is borne out in his discussion of the 
disagreement between a realist and an instrumentalist concerning theoretical entities: “To 
say that a theory is a reliable instrument—that is, that the predictions of observable 
events that it yields will be confirmed—is essentially the same as saying that the theory is 
true and that the theoretical, unobservable entities it speaks about exist” (1966, 256). Of 
course, it is reasonable to assume, for the sake of consistency with his enterprise, that 
Carnap is here speaking of answers to relevant internal questions. 
Nonetheless, Demopoulos would be correct in pointing out that in the same passage, 
Carnap refers to the disagreement between the realist and the instrumentalist as 
“essentially linguistic.” This reinforces the opinion that in spite of my clarification above, 
issues such as the acceptance or rejection of the atomic hypothesis for Carnap are 
determined by choice of framework. Briefly, I think there is nothing repugnant about this. 
On Carnap’s view, with regard to the Ramsified theory above, both the realist and the 
instrumentalist have the freedom to accept or reject a framework that countenances the 
assumptions required to formulate a theory that helps establish the existence of 
molecules, atoms, and the like. However, once they have accepted a framework, neither 
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has the freedom to make assertions internal to it without justification. As Carnap says, 
“Whoever makes an internal assertion is certainly obliged to justify it by providing 
evidence, empirical evidence in the case of electrons, logical proof in the case of the 
prime numbers” (Carnap 1992, 81). Hence, on Carnap’s conception of linguistic 
frameworks, the realist is not permitted to make extravagant claims about the existence of 
theoretical entities without providing requisite evidence, just as the instrumentalist cannot 
deny such a claim in the absence of the same.71 The choice of language is open to each in 
consonance with Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance regarding framework selection. I have 
more to say about this below. 
There is another reason for doubting the grounds for the concerns raised by Maddy 
and Demopoulos. Both claim that Carnap’s attitude towards the ontological status of 
theoretical entities reduces the issue of the reality of the atom—in a repugnant sense of 
the word—to one of mere choice of framework to adopt. In their view, this appears to be 
at variance with the fact that many scientists, such as Poincaré and Ostwald, were 
compelled to change their views about the ontological status of atoms following Perrin’s 
experiments: they did not believe atoms were real before, and had to subsequently 
concede that they were wrong. It seems injudicious to history to present this significant 
epistemological discovery as constituted by nothing more than choice of language. Since 
Carnap’s framework-dependent attitude yields this counter-intuitive result, they claim 
that his view of the issue is mistaken. 
                                                 
71 Friedman (2001, 258-9) makes a similar observation regarding the instrumentalist in the context of a 
Ramsified theory. 
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The above objection is premised on the following assumption about Carnap’s 
frameworks: that the mere inclusion of a term in the theoretical vocabulary of such a 
framework is sufficient for its interpretation and, hence, empirical verification. This 
assumption explains the setup that Maddy invites us to consider in her quote from a few 
pages ago. Assume that we have adopted a certain linguistic framework for scientific 
observation, and we are wondering whether to embrace a new theoretical entity called the 
atom. “As our current language has no terms for such things, no predicate ‘is an atom,’ 
no evidential rules with which to settle questions of their existence or nature, Carnap 
holds that this is not a question that can be asked or answered internally, that we must 
step outside our linguistic framework and address it pragmatically, as a conventional 
decision about whether or not to adopt a new linguistic framework” (my emphasis). 
There are two points to make here. First, the above is a misrepresentation of the historical 
circumstances surrounding empirical proof for the atom. As is evident from the work of 
Perrin (Chalmers 2009, 236-8), as well from reflective accounts of the issue offered by 
Stein (2014) and Poincarê himself (1946, 135), it is not as if the issue of the existence of 
the atom was resolved, or is resolvable, by the mere stipulation of a theoretical entity in 
the theoretical vocabulary. In fact, both Einstein and Perrin were working within a 
general framework that was acceptable to both energeticists and atomists at the time. This 
framework, nonetheless, allowed the resources for an empirical argument to be made for 
the existence of the atom. With regard to the discovery of the atom, the task of the 
framework—Carnap’s framework in the context of a philosophical reconstruction of the 
system—in that case was to allow for the conditions for the possibility of an empirical 
case to be mounted to the effect that matter is discrete rather than continuous. In this 
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sense, this case is analogous, although converse,72 to Maxwell’s introduction of the 
theoretical term for the displacement current described in Section §3.5. His consideration 
of the induction of magnetic fields by changing electric fields over time to amend 
Ampere’s circuital law did not require, in the context of Carnap’s or Carnapian 
frameworks, the adoption of a different framework requiring the stipulation of a 
completely novel theoretical entity alien to the apparatus of the system of electric and 
magnetic equations, as suggested by Maddy’s claim above. Instead, based on the 
experimental knowledge whereby charges can move from one place to another in general 
and a magnetic field always exists around a charge, Maxwell was able to introduce an 
additional term—m0μ0 ∂E / ∂t—to correct Ampere’s law. In sum, my first point is that the 
stipulation of a framework that contains a novel theoretical entity is not sufficient in 
Carnap’s frameworks to claim that such an entity exists, even as a response to an internal 
question to this effect. In fact, as I have explained in §3.4 while outlining Carnap’s view 
of the role of theoretical entities in his frameworks, a theoretical framework is an 
uninterpreted calculus prior to the introduction of correspondence rules that (mostly 
indirectly) connect theoretical terms with observational content. Furthermore, Carnap 
states that the question of the partial interpretation of theoretical terms, which involves 
formulating procedures for their measurement, is to be taken up separately for each 
theoretical term in the framework. Hence, the simple admission of a theoretical term to 
                                                 
72
 I write “converse” because while Maxwell provided a (general,) theoretical formulation to account 
for a mistake in Ampere’s law that he detected by studying the results of experimental observations, Perrin 
devised experimental procedures to test an alternative (theoretical) hypothesis about fundamental particles. 
  118 
our vocabulary that may designate something called the atom is not tantamount to 
admitting atoms to our ontology as a response to a relevant internal question.73 
Still, one might argue, even if the historical case of the discovery of the atom does not 
map on to the objection presented above, and even if it is the case that the methodological 
apparatus used by Perrin to prove the existence of the atom was common to both 
energeticists and atomists at the time, one still may imagine a case where, with regard to 
Carnap’s frameworks, the existence of a novel theoretical entity is confirmed (or 
disconfirmed) by the mere selection of a framework that can accommodate the requisite 
verifying (or falsifying) procedures. This brings me to the second, more general point that 
is pertinent to both Maddy and Demopoulos’s general objection above: to wit, that there 
is nothing repugnant about considering the acceptance of certain entities in the stead of 
others in a framework as a linguistic choice. Carnap allows for two ways in which a 
response can be offered to internal questions concerning the existence of theoretical 
entities invoked by a framework:  
                                                 
73
 In fact, Poincare'’s reaction to the debate concerning the status of the atom is exemplary in this 
regard as consistent with a Carnapian manner of thinking of the ontological status of theoretical entities. 
Until Perrin’s experiments, Poincare' regarded the hypothesis that atoms exist as “indifferent” because they 
had no bearing on or relation to the empirical results obtained. This strikes me as very similar to Carnap’s 
notion of an “uninterpreted” theoretical term, one that has been stipulated in the framework but is not 
associated with observation in any way, direct or indirect. This also explains how Poincare' was even able 
to make the claim that he did not believe in the existence of atoms, as this presupposed a definition of the 
concept in his system. 
Following Perrin’s experiments, the atomic hypothesis transitioned in Poincare'’s thinking from being 
an indifferent hypothesis to an empirical one. This is borne out by the fact that the atom was in fact a 
concept/term in the frameworks that Poincare' worked with prior to Perrin’s experiments. Hence, it is not 
the case that he was compelled to accept the existence of atoms following Perrin’s work, where he had not 
done so before, but rather that he was forced to change his mind about the attribution of truth values to 
statements concerning an entity (atom) that was already part of the framework. In this sense, Demopoulos 
and Maddy can also be considered to be mistaken about the historical details of the change in Poincare'’s 
attitude towards atoms. 
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i. Formal (logical or mathematical) proof in case the question can be answered 
by these means. This would include questions concerning the properties of the 
logical or mathematical apparatus assumed in the framework, such as “Is the 
set of natural numbers non-empty?,” “Are there such things as potential 
functions?,” “Do certain structures assumed in the framework have certain 
formal properties?,” and so on. 
ii. Empirical verification, by showing that a theoretical entity articulated in the 
framework has a physical interpretation in terms of observation, where the 
interpretation is provided by coordinating principles or rules of correspondence 
that connect, typically not directly, the theoretical term with the relevant, 
measurable observational terms. This answers questions such as “Is there such 
a thing as an atom?,” “Are there gravitational waves?,” and so on. Answers to 
these questions are not forthcoming using formal proof, but require verification 
through the results of observation in order to have a physical interpretation in 
the framework and, hence, the theory. That is to say, a physical interpretation 
is a crucial condition for the possibility of answering questions of this kind. 
As is evident from the articulation and methods for the verification of scientific 
theories in practice, the procedures that constitute (ii) above form major portions of 
various areas of scientific inquiry. For instance, a part of the empirical verification 
required in response to the relevant class of internal questions mentioned above concerns 
all of experimental physics, devoted to data acquisition and data acquisition procedures. 
In the context of Demopoulos’s argument, claiming that the Ramsified theory TCR has 
the same content as the original theory TC, the tacit but crucial assumption in his 
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presentation of his objection to Carnap is that a theory is adequately and accurately 
captured through its articulation in first-order logic. However, this claim is at best 
contentious.74 Given the limitations on quantification and predication inherent in such a 
logical system, as well as the insistence on such articulations in a language of (typically 
first-order) symbolic logic, the idea seems to be that once a framework for the 
representation of a theory has been determined, linking a theoretical term with 
verificatory procedures in such a framework is easy or relatively trivial. In a similar way, 
Maddy’s objection assumes that the sole act of the stipulation of a theoretical term in a 
framework will yield readily available, or at least simple, methods for its partial 
interpretation through correspondence rules that link it to measurable phenomena. This is 
the most plausible reason for them to think it appropriate to claim that the question of the 
existence of atoms is a mere linguistic choice in Carnap’s frameworks. From a considered 
perspective of Carnap’s frameworks, this is too hasty. The assignment of a partial 
interpretation to a theoretical term is what accords it significance in Carnap’s 
frameworks, and it is precisely downplaying the methodological complexity of this 
practice that allows Maddy and Demopoulos to assume that interpreting a novel 
theoretical term is simpler in Carnap’s frameworks than is reflected by such episodes in 
the history of science as the discovery of the atom. In fact, it took a significant 
technological advancement—the invention of the ultra-microscope by Siedentopf and 
Zsigmondy in 1903—as well as years of work on experimental design for Perrin to 
successfully execute his groundbreaking experiments. In a sense, Carnap would agree 
that the existence of the atom is established as a consequence of the stipulation of the 
                                                 
74 See Psillos (1999, 60). 
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relevant term in light of his frameworks. At the same time, he would claim that 
experimental work by Perrin to answer a crucial, internal question about the existence of 
the atom in the affirmative was vital in terms of the provision of rules of correspondence 
that provided an interpretation of the theoretical term “atom.” He would also admit that 
this yielded a significant epistemological insight for its time: that matter should be 
regarded as composed of discrete particles that obey well-known laws in certain 
distributions. Of course, this is an answer to a question posed within a framework to 
articulate a physical theory that posits atoms. So long as one does not seek to ask a 
question about the nature of reality independently of any scientific framework, such a 
response should be considered satisfactory. If, however, Maddy or Demopoulos seeks to 
assert that confirmed scientific hypotheses make assertions about the nature of reality 
beyond the considerations that pertain to a corresponding framework, a stronger 
argument is needed for why theoretical claims made or confirmed with the assumption of 
an extensive, often abstract, apparatus should be assumed to hold without it. 
Hence, while the stipulation of a theoretical entity corresponding to the atom may be a 
framework-dependent choice, the assignment to it of an interpretation and, hence, the 
discovery or delineation of procedures by which it can be associated with appropriate 
observational terms as well as the methods to determine the magnitudes of these latter 
terms, while framework dependent in a sense, constitute a far-from-trivial exercise. This 
leaves room for the scientist and the philosopher to make insights that can be considered 
to be genuinely epistemically significant, with the proviso that they remain internal to the 
framework in question. Hence, contra Maddy and Demopoulos, there is no reason to take 
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issue with the fact that the existence of the atom is determined by choice of framework in 
Carnap. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have offered a response to the third major research question guiding 
my project in this dissertation—What can we conclude about the nature of mathematical 
entities employed in a theory from its success in representing phenomena, and how ought 
the anticipated philosophical benefit of such inquiries shape our preferences concerning 
research questions in the discipline? By way of response, I presented in §4.1 and §4.2 the 
attitudes of Quine and Carnap, respectively, to ontological questions regarding theoretical 
entities in the milieu of scientific theories. Using the Indispensability Argument as an 
instance, I then showed in §4.3 how a commitment to the Quinean view of ontology in 
science has led to debates in the literature where there appears to be no consensus on 
satisfaction conditions that would be acceptable to all parties to the debate. Hence, the 
philosophical and methodological profit to be drawn from debates of this kind, grounded 
firmly in a Quinean outlook on the world and science, is suspect at best. On the contrary, 
Carnap’s deflationary position on ontological questions that flows from his conception of 
frameworks for the reconstruction of scientific theories demands precisely the sort of 
methodological clarity that is absent in Quine, and hence is superior for the pursuit of 
research questions in the philosophy of science in general. 
Finally, in order to underline the contemporary relevance and effectiveness of 
Carnap’s distinction between questions that are internal to a framework and those 
external to it, which helps identify and dismiss misguided metaphysical inquiries as 
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meaningless, I defend this distinction in §4.4 against recent concerns raised by Maddy 
and Demopoulos in the context of experimental proof for the existence of the atom. The 
general concern shared by both is that Carnap’s view of ontology in science tends to 
unfairly trivialise instances of genuine epistemological discovery in science as a simple 
consequence of choice of linguistic framework to reconstruct a given theory. I have 
pointed out in response that such an objection presumes that the assignment of an 
interpretation to theoretical entities in Carnap’s frameworks as well as in science is a 
straightforward matter. Since neither scientific practice nor Carnap’s description of the 
mechanism of the assignment of physical interpretation to theoretical entities in his 
frameworks suggests that this is the case, there is no reason to accept this presumption. 
To the contrary, Carnap’s frameworks impose stringent demands on their users, 
regardless of their ontological predilections, to clarify their assumptions and support their 
claims with the necessary evidence. Hence, the distinction between internal and external 
questions in his linguistic frameworks does not misrepresent the significance of such 
epistemological achievements as the atomic hypothesis.  
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5 Conclusions 
5.1 Responses to guiding questions 
I had motivated my project in this dissertation at the outset by asking three general 
questions in §1.1 concerning the role and nature of mathematics in scientific 
representation. My aim in posing and considering these questions has been to illuminate 
certain explanatory ways in which mathematics can contribute to scientific 
representation, and highlight shortcomings in contemporary proposals that claim to be 
all-encompassing in this regard. Furthermore, I have sketched and defended a proposal 
for the treatment of theoretical entities in scientific frameworks in the spirit of Carnap, 
and have argued that adherence to such a conception is beneficial for research in the 
philosophy of science, particularly in the context of ontological debates regarding the 
status of theoretical entities invoked in scientific theories. 
By way of responding to the first of the questions posed in §1.1—How does 
mathematics assist in scientific representation?—my examination of the accounts of 
mathematical explanation put forth by Kitcher and Bueno and Colyvan in Chapter 2 
yielded a number of insights. We saw that there are at least two general ways in which 
mathematics is explanatory in scientific representation by drawing on the work of 
Pincock and Kitcher, and examining episodes in the history of science: i) connecting 
different phenomena using mathematical analogies, and ii) isolating recurring features of 
phenomena through acausal representations.75 An instance of the first is the famous 
Königsberg bridge example, considered in §2.3 in the context of the mapping account of 
                                                 
75 Pincock (2012, §3.2) also thinks that mathematics can be explanatory in science by tracking causes. 
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explanation. This is a steady-state representation, one where the main features of interest 
of the representation do not change over time. The second kind of explanatory 
contribution results from employing the mathematical structure used for one kind of 
physical system to represent another kind. The interesting aspect of this practice is that 
the target systems are fairly diverse and have little in common as physical systems, but 
are unified by their common mathematical form. As examples, we saw in §2.2.1 Fisher’s 
mathematical analogy between biological populations and the representation of ideal 
gases in statistical mechanics, as well as the mathematical framework common to 
Laplace’s equations representing the velocity of irrotational fluids and the forces acting 
on electrostatic charges in an electric field, among other phenomena. In addition to their 
use in appropriately conceptualising intractable problems and clarifying 
interdependencies among the variables involved, Pincock has claimed that a benefit of 
such analogies is that a small amount of experimental testing to confirm one of the 
above-mentioned representations would lend it a larger confirmational boost than if it 
were not mathematically related to the other representation, assuming that the latter has 
been successfully confirmed. Thus, little testing of the electrostatic case lends it far 
greater confirmation than would be the case if it were not linked to the representation of 
irrotational fluid flow. This is because “the independent confirmation of the way the 
mathematics is deployed for the fluids gives the scientist a template against which to 
judge the success of the electrostatic representation” (Pincock 2012, 79). 
Furthermore, my critique of the unificationist account proposed by Kitcher and the 
inferential conception of Bueno and Colyvan helped reveal that on account of structural 
shortcomings, both are inadequate as their corresponding frameworks for representation 
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are too restrictive to accommodate a number of kinds of explanatory contributions of 
mathematics to science and historical as well as contemporary instances of application of 
theories. One clear desideratum of a framework that can appropriately represent 
mathematical entities that emerges from my examination is that it appropriately reflect 
the structure of scientific theories, specifically theories of physics. It is this conclusion 
that prompted question B posed in §1.1— Is there a promising philosophical account 
available to represent the theoretical/mathematical entities employed in our scientific 
theories in order to help clarify and explain their role?—as well as my proposal and 
defence of a Carnapian framework for the representation of theoretical entities in 
scientific theories in Chapter 3. On the one hand, my choice of the linguistic frameworks 
of the sort proposed by Carnap was dictated by the need for a representation capable of 
adequately representing scientific theories. As we saw in §3.4 and §3.5, Carnap’s detailed 
proposal for the treatment of theoretical terms appears to be faithful to the reasoning 
deployed in formulating such theories and sensitive to the various considerations at play. 
In fact, a careful treatment of the popular criticisms of Carnap’s frameworks in the 
literature showed that these were based on a similar disregard for the details of scientific 
reasoning to the kind found in the proposals of Kitcher as well as Bueno and Colyvan. On 
the other hand, my departure from Carnap’s exact view of theoretical entities in his 
linguistic frameworks—what renders my proposal Carnapian—was motivated by the 
same desire to render such frameworks even more harmonious with scientific reasoning 
and practice. First, the ease of use of models, in accord with a semantic view of theories 
in contrast to the syntactic view advocated by Carnap, as well as their widespread 
employment in theoretical and the applied sciences, prompted my adoption of these in 
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§3.2. Second, my emphasis on a bottom-up methodology to investigate the role of 
theoretical terms in scientific systems, as opposed to the general, top-down approach 
favoured by Carnap, was driven by a similar desire to capture all the important features of 
scientific reasoning and practice. The idea is to compare the structure of theory with 
instances of its application to render the former better informed and more reflective of the 
latter. As my treatment of Maxwell’s discovery of the equations of electromagnetism in 
§3.6 showed, such an approach offers considerable reward, particularly by way of 
clarifying the interdependence of theory and experimentation in science. Lastly, my 
proposal in §3.7 that Carnapian frameworks take cognisance of the dirty details of the 
establishment of relationships between models of the theory and those of the data, as well 
as the manoeuvres involved in rendering each tractable to computation in the first place, 
is motivated by similar concerns. I should clarify that the above is intended to point out 
the ways in which my proposal departs from Carnap’s approach while remaining firmly 
embedded in the general insights and framework supplied by his genius. It is certainly not 
intended to be anywhere near the final word on fruitful representations of physical 
systems in philosophy. Instead, the above considerations are meant to act as a 
springboard for future research into such questions, especially for philosophers 
sympathetic to the approach sketched above.  
Furthermore, in response to the final question posed for my project in this 
dissertation—What can we conclude about the nature of mathematical entities employed 
in a theory from its success in representing phenomena, and how ought the anticipated 
philosophical benefit of such inquiries shape our preferences concerning research 
questions in the discipline?—I endorse in Chapter 4 Carnap’s approach to ontological 
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questions concerning theoretical entities in science, whereby such questions, as they are 
typically formulated, evince a confusion between inquiries that are meaningful within the 
context of a framework and those that are not. I then make a pragmatic argument to the 
effect that Carnap’s response to questions regarding the ontological status of theoretical 
entities in science, based on his linguistic frameworks, is preferable in framing and 
investigating philosophical problems to Quine’s approach to the issue. To this end, I 
show how commitment to a Quinean epistemology, and hence a subscription to his view 
of theoretical entities in science, has led to misguided discussions such as the 
Indispensability Argument debate that offer neither a satisfactory resolution nor any 
methodological boon. It is thus to the benefit of research in philosophy to seek guidance 
from the approach of Carnap rather than Quine. 
 
5.2 General philosophical lesson 
I also hope that the reader can see a general philosophical lesson in my work in this 
dissertation. The tendency to consider theory in isolation from considerations pertaining 
to its practical implementation is by no means unique to the philosophy of science. In 
fact, if anything, this has become second nature in a number of issues in meta-ethics, 
normative ethics, the philosophy of mind, and many other areas. In ethics, for instance, 
such an approach is evidenced in the absence of any methodology regarding the 
formulation and assessment of an ethical theory. This results, first, in the approval of 
crude heuristics76 as competent substitutes for a careful methodology and, second, in the 
                                                 
76 The Open Question Argument due to Moore (1903) is representative. 
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acceptance or dismissal of theories based on extreme and unrealistic problems that 
occupy the periphery of our experience and, hence, our ethical considerations.77 This 
yields discourse that is as unfertile as the Realism–Anti-realism debate in the philosophy 
of science,78 without a clear idea of or agreement on the formulation of the question at 
issue, the standards of evidence considered acceptable, and the implications of the 
possible outcomes in the context of practical life.  
Insofar as the general considerations of my work are transferrable to other domains of 
the subject, this dissertation should be considered to espouse method and detail in our 
pursuits in philosophy. 
                                                 
77 An apt example is the famous trolley problem. See, for instance, Foot (1967), Thomson (1976), 
Unger (1996), and Singer (2005). 
78 I suppose the best instantiation is a homonymous debate in meta-ethics. See Sayre–McCord (2015) 
for a summary. 
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